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Abstract
The Basel Committee published its proposals for a revised capital adequacy framework
(the Basel II Capital Accord) in June 2006. One of the main objectives of this framework
is to improve the incentives for state-of-the-art risk management in banking, especially in
the area of credit risk in view of Basel II. The new regulation seeks to provide incentives
for greater awareness of diﬀerences in risk through more risk-sensitive minimum capital
requirements based on numerical formulas. This attempt to control bank behaviour has
a heavy reliance on regulatory ratios like the risk-based capital adequacy ratio (CAR). In
essence, such ratios compare the capital that a bank holds to the level of credit, market
and operational risk that it bears. Due to this fact the objectives in this dissertation
are as follows. Firstly, in an attempt to address these problems and under assumptions
about retained earnings, loan-loss reserves, the market and shareholder-bank owner rela-
tionships, we construct continuous-time models of the risk-based CAR which is computed
from credit and market risk-weighted assets (RWAs) and bank regulatory capital (BRC)
in a stochastic setting. Secondly, we demonstrate how the CAR can be optimized in
terms of equity allocation. Here, we employ dynamic programming for stochastic opti-
mization, to obtain and verify the results. Thirdly, an important feature of this study is
that we apply the mean-variance approach to obtain an optimal strategy that diversiﬁes
a portfolio consisting of three assets. In particular, chapter 5 is an original piece of work
by the author of this dissertation where we demonstrate how to employ a mean-variance
optimization approach to equity allocation under certain conditions.
Key words: Bank management, Stochastic optimization, Optimal asset allocation, Amor-
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tizations, Capital adequacy ratio, Bank regulatory capital, Stochastic banking model,
Mean-Variance approach, Credit and market risk-weighted assets.
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Key Deﬁnitions
Amortization is the distribution of a single lump-sum cash ﬂow into many smaller cash
ﬂow installments, as determined by an amortization schedule. Unlike other repayment
models, each repayment installment consists of both principal and interest. Amortization
is chieﬂy used in loan repayments (a common example being a mortgage loan) and in
sinking funds. Payments are divided into equal amounts for the duration of the loan,
making it the simplest repayment model. A greater amount of the payment is applied to
interest at the beginning of the amortization schedule, while more money is applied to
principal at the end.
Capital Adequacy Ratio is a measure of the amount of a bank’s capital relative to its
risk weighted assets expressed as a percentage, that is,
CAR =
Indicator of Absolute Amount of Bank Capital
Indicator of Absolute Level of Bank Risk
.
Credit risk is deﬁned as the potential of a bank borrower or counter party failing to meet
its obligations in accordance with agreed terms.
Market risk as the risk of losses in on- and oﬀ-balance sheet positions arising from move-
ments in market prices.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Bank management mainly involves four operational concerns namely liquidity manage-
ment, investment management, liability management and capital adequacy management.
Liquidity management involves managing reserves to meet inﬂows and outﬂows and vary-
ing levels of loan commitments. These deposit ﬂows are aﬀected by interest rate move-
ments that are relative to other ﬁnancial instruments. Deposit ﬂows are also aﬀected
by competitive rates determined by banks in their respective geographic markets. Two
types of liquidity are available to meet potential liquidity requirements, that is, bank
asset management and liability management. Bank asset management mainly involves
achieving proﬁt maximization through high return on loans and securities, reducing risk
and providing for liquidity needs. In terms of meeting liquidity needs, banks use near-
cash assets, including net funds sold to other banks and money market securities. Banks
endeavour to grant loans to credit worthy entities that are willing to pay high interest
rates and are unlikely to default on their loan contracts. Furthermore, banks are likely to
purchase high return securities with low risk. Banks try to lower the risk associated with
these securities by diversifying their investment portfolio.
Liability management supports lending activities and achieve balanced growth in earn-
ings and bank assets without excessive liquidity risk. It involves accepting funding from
depositors, and securing additional funds from other ﬁnancial institutions, for use in lend-
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ing and investing. Other tools of liability management are interest rate hedging against
unexpected market moves, and maintaining a controlled gap between asset and liability
maturities for controlled speculation on interest rate shifts.
The bank item that can be considered as the second largest asset on a bank’s balance sheet
is investments (securities held by the bank). Investment management mainly involves se-
curities that are purchased by the bank to produce income in the form of interest paid,
capital gains and it can also fulﬁll the role for liquidity needs. Investment securities are
an alternative source of income during recession periods when the demand for commercial
loans is relatively low. As the economic environment recovers and loan demands increase,
these securities can be converted into loans or may be sold to fund higher-earning loans
and other investment opportunities. Investment securities may be pledged as collateral
on public deposits of federal, state and local governments borrowing from the federal
reserve bank. The investment securities can be categorized into two types of securities
namely government securities (these are treasury notes and treasury bonds purchased by
the bank having maturities ranging from 1− 5 years) and municipal securities (these are
bonds issued by the state and local governments to ﬁnance various public works such as
bridges, schools and roads). Purchasing municipal securities may be used to reduce in-
come taxes. Moreover investment securities can increase the diversiﬁcation of the bank’s
total asset portfolio or in certain cases take advantage of interest movements that can
increase capital gains.
Capital adequacy management involves the decision of how much a bank should hold
and how it should be accessed. From a shareholder’s perspective, using less capital is one
way to increase asset earnings and so earn higher return on equities. From the regulator’s
perspective, banks should increase their capital to ensure the safety and soundness in
the case where earnings may become negative. Bank regulators are also concerned about
ﬁnancial risk that could increase the probability of bank failure. In the event where the
variability of earnings after taxes increases, the interest and non-interest expenses may
2
 
 
 
 
exceed bank earnings and bank capital should absorb such potential losses. Although
requiring a bank to maintain a higher capital level lowers the ﬁnancial risk, such a re-
quirement disrupts the eﬃciency and competitiveness of the banking system meaning that
the aforementioned requirement acts as a constraint on the lending activities of a bank.
It may also constrain the rate at which bank assets may be expanded. A more detailed
discussion on the these diﬀerent management topics can be found in Fraser, Gup, Kolari
[49] and Mishkin [71].
The bank is assumed to engage in unrestricted borrowing, short-selling and capitalization
activities. The study of the dynamics of portfolio and capital structure (see the review
papers Bhattacharya, Thakor [25]; Freixas, Rochet [50] and Santos [85]) has always been
an important issue in risk management for banks. In this regard, Dangl, Lehar [36] and
Decamps, Rochet, Roger [38] construct continuous-time models which permit optimal
control problems to be solved in the context of capital requirements and portfolio selection.
With regard to the former, the driving force behind bank capital stipulations is the risk
shifting incentive due to the deposit insurance guarantee. Also, bank portfolio choice
is important for a number of reasons. Firstly, it may contribute to an increase in the
bank’s charter value that directly beneﬁts depositors (or providers of deposit insurance),
shareholders and creditors. Also, it assists regulators in taking corrective action when
confronted with related market information.
1.1 Main problems and Outline of the Dissertation
This study has connections with each of the areas of importance mentioned in the previous
sections (that is sections (1.3.3), (1.3.4) and (1.3.5)). In this regard, a key assumption is
that the underlying market is complete so that the complete set of possible gambles on
future bank states can be constructed with existing assets. Also, we assume that every
debtholder is a shareholder and vice versa with their philosophies being perfectly aligned
with that of the bank owners. The main problems addressed in this dissertation can be
3
 
 
 
 
formulated as follows.
Problem 1.1.1 (Stochastic Dynamic Modelling of TRWAs and BRC): How can
we model the dynamics of Risk-Weighted Assets (RWAs) and Bank Regulatory Capital
(BRC) stochastically ? (see Sections (2.1) and (2.2)).
Problem 1.1.2 (Amortization Function): Can we ﬁnd an amortization function that
provides an improved model for loan repayments by bank debtors ? (see Proposition 3.3.1
in Section 3.3).
Problem 1.1.3 (Stochastic Dynamic Modelling of Risk-Based CARs): Under
Basel II, can we ﬁnd a stochastic diﬀerential equation (SDE) for the dynamics of the
risk-based Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) that takes the stochastic features of the BRC
and RWAs into account ? (Theorem 4.1.1 in Section 4.1).
Problem 1.1.4 (Capital adequacy ratio threshold process): Can we ﬁnd an ex-
plicit formula for the capital adequacy ratio threshold process zp(t)? (see Theorem 4.2.1
in Section 4.2).
Problem 1.1.5 (Optimal Bank Equity Allocation for Risk-Based CARs): Un-
der Basel II, can we ﬁnd an optimal equity allocation strategy that will optimize a portfolio
consisting of three assets via the dynamic programming algorithm for stochastic optimiza-
tion? (Theorem 4.3.1 in Section 4.3.1).
Problem 1.1.6 (An Optimal equity allocation strategy): Under Basel II, can we
ﬁnd an optimal equity allocation strategy that will optimize a portfolio consisting of three
assets under the mean-variance approach? (Proposition 5.1.4 in Chapter 5).
The study is organized in the following manner. In chapter 2 we explore the asset-liability
management of a commercial bank. In particular, we explore bank regulatory capital and
total risk-weighted assets. In both cases we propose a continuous-time model for each of
the aforementioned banking items. Chapter 3 discusses the importance of an alternative
4
 
 
 
 
form of amortization function that may describe how loan repayments by bank debtors
can be improved. In obtaining the amortization function we ﬁrst derive a partial diﬀeren-
tial equation that the amortization function must satisfy through a traditional approach
and a martingale approach under the assumption that the interest rate is modelled as
a diﬀusion process. Furthermore we decompose the amortization function into a loan
repayment and interest function. Under this scenario we provide explicit formulas for a
ﬁxed loan, a series loan and an annuity loan, under the assumption that the interest rate
is ﬁxed. We also discuss and simulate bank loan-issuing rate. Chapter 4 discusses cer-
tain types of capital adequacy ratios (CARs), that is, core, equity, risk-based Tier 1 and
total CAR. In this chapter we derive an explicit formula for the capital adequacy ratio
of a commercial bank under the Basel II CAR paradigm and provide simulations over
a certain period. We also discuss threshold processes and banking benchmarks (see for
instance Mukkudem-Petersen, Petersen [76]). Furthermore we explore an optimal asset
allocation strategy for a commercial bank and provide a numerical example that illus-
trates key results. In particular, we make an optimal asset allocation decision (choice of
how much of each asset to hold) where the weight in risky assets is equivalent to invest-
ing in a combination of bank assets consisting of cash, bond and equity funds. Chapter
5 discusses an optimal strategy in bank management where we derive explicit formulae
associated with the capital adequacy ratio, bank capital and total risk-weighted assets
respectively. In doing so we provide simulations for these banking items to capture its
behaviour under certain assumptions. Furthermore we obtain an optimal strategy via a
mean-variance approach that diversify a portfolio consisting of three assets. We point
out that this chapter constitutes a new contribution. Chapter 6 discusses the main issues
encountered in this study and point out shortcomings that need further investigation.
1.2 Preliminaries
In this section we introduce some basic elementary concepts and properties of probability
and measure theory that is used throughout this study. We provide now deﬁnitions
5
 
 
 
 
and concepts relevant to brownian motion (see for instance Bhattacharya, Waymire [24],
Etheridge [42] and Øksendal [80]).
Deﬁnition 1.2.1 (see Ash [5] or Cohn [34])
Let F be a collection of subsets of a set Ω. Then F is called a field (algebra) if and only
if Ω ∈ F and F is closed under complementation and ﬁnite union, that is,
1. Ω ∈ F .
2. For a set A, if A ∈ F , then also Ac ∈ F (Ac is the complement of A).
3. if A1, A2, A3, . . . , An ∈ F , then
⋃n
i=1 Ai ∈ F .
Remark: It follows thatF is closed under ﬁnite intersection. For if A1, A2, A3, . . . , An ∈
F , then
n⋂
i=1
Ai =
( n⋃
i=1
Aci
)c
∈ F .
Deﬁnition 1.2.2 (see Ash [5] or Cohn [34])
Let Ω be an arbitrary set and let F be a collection of subsets of a set Ω. Then F is
called a σ-ﬁeld (σ-algebra) if and only if F is a ﬁeld and F is closed under countable
intersection.
For a further discussion on inﬁnite sequences, algebras and σ-algebra we refer the reader
to Ash [5] or Cohn [34].
Deﬁnition 1.2.3 (see for instance Grimmett, Stirzaker [53])
A probability measure P on (Ω,F) is a function P : F → [0, 1] satisfying
1. P(∅) = 0, P(Ω) = 1;
2. If A1, A2, A3, . . . is a collection of disjoint members of F , so that Ai ∩Aj = ∅ for all
pairs i, j satisfying i = j, then
P
( ∞⋃
i=1
Ai
)
=
∞∑
i=1
P(Ai).
6
 
 
 
 
The following deﬁnition is fundamental since it explains the idea behind a stochastic
process.
Deﬁnition 1.2.4 (see Bhattacharya, Waymire [24]):
Given an indexed set I, a stochastic process indexed by I is a collection of random
variables {Bλ : λ ∈ I} on a probability space (Ω,F ,P) taking values in a set S. The set
S is called the state space of the process.
For a more detailed description of stochastic processes the reader is referred to Bhat-
tacharya, Waymire [24].
Deﬁnition 1.2.5 (see Etheridge [42])
A real-valued stochastic process {X(t)}t≥0 is a P-Brownian motion if for some real con-
stant σ, under P,
1. for each s ≥ 0 and t > 0 the random variable X(t + s) − X(s) has the normal
distribution with mean zero and variance σ2t,
2. for each n ≥ 1 and any times 0 ≤ t0 ≤ t1 ≤ · · · ≤ tn, the random variables
{X(tr)−X(tr−1)} are independent,
3. X(0) = 0,
4. X(t) is continuous in t ≥ 0.
Consider an n-dimensional process X(t) = (X1(t), X2(t), . . . , X1(n))
′
. If each of the Xi(t)
is a standard one-dimensional brownian motion and if each Xi(t) are independent of each
other, then X(t) is said to be standard n-dimensional brownian motion (see Cairns [31]).
Deﬁnition 1.2.6 (see Hunt, Kennedy [56])
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space and {Ft} be a ﬁltration of F . A stochastic process
M(t) is a {F}t≥0-martingale (or just a martingale when the ﬁltration is clear) if:
1. M(t) is adapted to {F(t)} (that is, for every t > 0, M(t) is {F(t)}-measurable);
7
 
 
 
 
2. E[|M(t)|] < ∞ for all t ≥ 0;
3. the conditional expectation E[M(t)|F(s)] = M(s) almost surely for all s ∈ [0, t].
Theorem 1.2.7 (The Integrations by parts (stochastic product rule)): (see Etheridge
[42])
If K(t) = MK(t) + AK(t) and P (t) = MP (t) + AP (t) where {MK(t)} and {MP (t)}
are continuous (P, {F}t≥0)-martingales and AK(t) and AP (t) are continuous processes of
bounded variation, then
d(K(t)P (t)) = K(t)dP (t) + P (t)dK(t) + d[MK(t),MP (t)]. (1.1)
Theorem 1.2.8 (The Feynman-Kac stochastic representation): (see for instance
Cairns [31] and Etheridge [42])
Assume that the function F solves the boundary value problem
∂F
∂t
(t, x) + μ(t, x)
∂F
∂x
(t, x) +
1
2
σ2(t, x)
∂2F
∂x2
(t, x) = 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
F (t, x) = Φ(x). (1.2)
Deﬁne {H(t)}t≤0≤T to be the solution of the stochastic diﬀerential equation
dH(t) = μ(t, H(t)) + σ(t, H(t))dX(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
where {X(t)}t≥0 is a standard Brownian motion under the measure P. If∫ T
0
E
[(
μ(t, H(t))
∂F
∂x
)(t, H(t))
)2]
ds < ∞,
then F (t, x) = EP[Φ(H(T ))|H(t) = x].
Theorem 1.2.9 (The n-dimensional Itoˆ formula)): (see Etheridge [42])
Let {J(t)}t≥0 = {J1(t), J2(t), . . . , X1n(t)}t≥0 solve
dJ i(t) = μi(t) +
n∑
j=1
σij(t)dX
j(t), i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
8
 
 
 
 
where {Xj(t)}t≥0 are independent P-Brownian motions. Further suppose that the real-
valued functions f(t, x) on R+ ×Rn are continuously diﬀerentiable with respect to t and
twice continuously diﬀerentiable in the x-variables. Then deﬁning Q(t) = f(t, J(t)) we
have
dQ(t) =
∂f
∂t
(t, J(t)) +
n∑
i=1
∂f
∂xi
(t, J(t))dJ i(t) +
1
2
n∑
i,j=1
∂2f
∂xi∂xj
(t, J(t))Cij(t)dt (1.3)
where Cij(t) =
∑n
k=1 σik(t)σjk(t).
For detailed descriptions on brownian motion and Itoˆ integrals and its properties, Mar-
tingale Representation Theorem, Girsanov Theorem and Radon-Nikodym derivatives, we
refer the reader to Etheridge [42] and Øksendal [80].
The introduction of a new measure Q provides a useful computational tool to determine
an alternative equation such as for instance the dynamics of the stochastic risk-free in-
terest rate. Moving from the probability measure P to the new measure Q enables one to
illustrate how results about interest rates can be specialized to real-world scenarios.
1.3 Relation to Existing Literature
In this section we consider the connection between this study and previous banking liter-
ature.
1.3.1 A Discussion and Brief Literature Review about Stochas-
tic Banking models
Bank Securities
Treasury securities or treasuries are bonds issued by national treasuries in most countries
as a means of borrowing money to meet government expenditures not covered by tax rev-
enues. As a result, they are the debt ﬁnance instruments of the federal government. Also,
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they act as an index that is used to establish interest rates for adjustable rate mortgages
(ARMs). On the other hand, marketable securities are stocks and bonds that can easily
and quickly be converted into cash. A marketable security has a readily determined fair
market value and will generally have highly liquid markets allowing the security to be sold
at a reasonable price. The banking institution comprises of treasury securities (illiquid
assets) as well as marketable securities (liquid assets). Marketable securities are used to
combat expected and unexpected ﬂuctuations on the bank’s balance sheet. Commercial
banks also hold certain amounts to protect against the large volatile transaction deposits.
The need to hold large amounts of marketable securities may be reduced by means of
growth and sustainability of ﬁnancial markets and the diversity of ﬁnancial derivative
products such as forwards, options and futures contracts which enhances the ﬂexibility
in bank liquidity management. In certain countries such as Japan, Germany and United
States of America where the banking environment and ﬁnancial markets are well devel-
oped, banks have been forced (obligated) to purchase government bonds with the purpose
to meet deposit demands. Van Greuning, Brajovic Bratanovic [90] states that the main
purpose of such asset requirements is to allow the ﬂow of ﬁnance to customers (recipients)
in a predictable manner. The following paragraph discusses the ﬁnancial market in which
the commercial bank operates.
We allow a commercial bank to invest in a ﬁnancial market with (n + 1) assets (that
is a market with n risky assets and 1 riskless asset). One of these assets is riskless (repre-
senting the treasuries with a return rate r(t)) while the assets 1, 2, . . . , n are risky (repre-
senting the market shares). In the paper of Mukkudem-Petersen, Petersen [73] (see also
Fouche, Mukkudem-Petersen, Petersen [46]) the dynamics of the riskless asset (denoted
by P0(t)) and risky assets (Pi(t)) are represented by stochastic diﬀerential equations. The
dynamics of the riskless asset are represented by:
dP0(t) = P0(t)
[
r0 dt + σ0dX0(t)
]
, P0(0) = 1. (1.4)
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Considering the case where the short risk-free rate of interest r0(t) > 0 is constant, we
assume that the volatility parameter σ0 = 0. The dynamics of the riskless asset (1.4)
reduces to
dP0(t) = P0(t)r0 dt, P0(0) = 1
and the value of the monetary units in the bank account at time t is given by (see for
instance, Korn [62])
P0(t) = exp
{∫ t
0
r0(s)ds
}
.
The evolution of the risky assets follow a geometric brownian motion and is given by (see
for instance, Korn [62]):
dPi(t) = Pi(t)
[
bidt +
n∑
j=1
σij dXj(t)
]
, Pi(0) = P0, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, (1.5)
Pi(t) = P0 exp
(∫ t
0
(bi − 1
2
m∑
j=1
σ2ij) ds +
m∑
j=1
∫ t
0
σij(s) dXj(s)
)
,
where bi and σij , 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n are considered as positive constants and the vector
(X0(t), X1(t), X2(t), . . . , Xn(t))
′
is an (n+1)-dimensional brownian motion deﬁned on the probability space (Ω,F ,P). The
completion of the ﬁltration {F}t≥0 is deﬁned by
σ{(X0(t), X1(t), X2(t), . . . , Xn(t))′ : 0 ≤ s ≤ t}.
The coeﬃcient bi is the mean rate of return of the i-th risky asset and σij ≥ 0 represents the
covariance between asset i and asset j for all i, j = 1, 2, . . . , n. The explicit representation
of the risky assets Pi(t) is obtained from Itoˆ’s formula (1.3).
The loan-issuing rate, l(t) (described in section (3.4)), is conditioned on the increase in
the returns on securities. Furthermore we assume there exist a correlation −1 ≤ pi ≤ 1
between the Brownian motions Xl and Xi for i = 1, . . . , n. This implies that
E
[
Xl(t), Xi(s)
]
= pimin(t, s)
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for i = 1, . . . , n and
Xl(t) =
√
1− p˜′ p˜X0(t) + p˜′X˜(t),
where p˜ is deﬁned as
p˜ = (p1(t), . . . , pn(t))
′
and
X˜(t) = (X1(t), . . . , Xn(t))
′
.
p˜
′
p˜ = 1 implies that the risk in loan issuing cannot be eliminated by trading in the
ﬁnancial market (see Mukkudem-Petersen, Petersen [73]).
The market price of risk, ζ˜, is deﬁned as the expected excess return, or risk premium,
that investors (shareholders) are prepared to absorb due to the investment in risky assets.
The market price of risk (also known as the Sharp Ratio) is expressed as
ζ˜ =
b˜− r01¯
σ
b˜ = r01¯ + σζ˜ (1.6)
where b˜ = (b1, b2, . . . , bn)
′
, 1¯ represents a column vector of ones 1’s and the matrix σ
is assumed to be non-singular. In this study we assume the market price of risk to be
constant which reﬂects an economy without business cycles. If the market price of risk is
modelled as a stochastic model such as the mean-reverting process then it will reﬂect an
economy with business cycles. The risk premium, γi, on a risky asset i is deﬁned by
γi =
n∑
j=1
σij ζ˜j, (1.7)
where ζ˜ = (ζ˜1, ζ˜2, . . . , ζ˜n)
′
. Deducing from (1.6) and (1.7) it follows that
bi = r0 + γi. (1.8)
Expression (1.8) suggests that the return on investments from the risky assets is generally
higher than the return on the riskless asset therefore we have bi > r0 for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
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This means that banks have incentives to invest with risk. The stochastic diﬀerential
equation (1.5) may now be expressed as
dPi(t) = Pi(t)
[
(r0 +
n∑
j=1
σij ζ˜j) dt +
n∑
j=1
σij dXj(t)
]
, Pi(0) = P0, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Pi(t) is deﬁned as the total return, that is, the amount of a single premium investment
in risky asset i with reinvestment of dividend income. The volatility matrix denoted by
Ψ = (σij)
n
i,j=1 is invertible which allows the symmetric matrix Ψ = σσ
′
being positive
deﬁnite. The value of the marketable securities invested at time t in the risky asset Pi
is denoted by πi(t) for i = 1, . . . , n. The remainder S −
∑n
i=1 πi(t), is invested into the
riskless asset. No bounds are placed on any of these variables. Borrowing as well as short-
selling are allowed. A negative value of πi(t) < 0, means that the bank is selling part of
its risky asset, Pi(t) short. On the other hand if πi(t) > S(t) then the bank gets into debt
to purchase the stock, borrowing at a riskless rate of interest r0. We assume that the
portfolio process or strategy {Π˜(t) : t ≥ 0}, with Π˜(t) = (π1(t), π2(t), π3(t), . . . , πn(t))′.
The portfolio strategy or portfolio process is an Rn-measurable process adapted to the
ﬁltration {F}t≥0 such that
∫ ∞
0
Π˜(s)
′
Π˜(s) ds < ∞.
Bank Reserves
Bank reserves refer to the amount of money a bank sets aside, and does not lend, to
meet day-to-day currency withdrawals by its customers. Since it is uncommon for a bank
to have all its depositors withdraw all of their funds simultaneously, only a portion of
total deposits is needed as reserves. The bank uses the remaining deposits to earn proﬁt,
either by issuing loans or by investing in assets such as bonds and stocks (see Gideon,
Mukkudem-Petersen, Petersen [52] and Mukuddem-Petersen, Petersen, Schoeman, Tau
[75]).
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1.3.2 Bank liabilities
Liabilities in general provide a good indication as to which types of risk a ﬁnancial in-
stitution is exposed too. Bank liabilities such as deposits, borrowing and bank capital
constitute the sources of funds. The decomposition of bank liabilities depends greatly
on a bank’s business operation and market orientation. In general, the bank’s liability
structure also has an impact on the risk management policies of a bank.
Borrowing
According to Mishkin [71] bank borrowing constitutes the second largest proportion of
a bank’s total liabilities. Banks borrow a certain amount from other banks (known as
interbank funding) as well as from the central bank. We denote this transaction (that is
bank borrowing) by B : Ω× T → R+ from other banks and the central bank. The reason
why banks participate in interbank funding is due to the temporary loan requirements
and large withdrawals of customer deposits. These amounts due include deposits and
loans which are considered as volatile sources of funding.
Commercial banks that participate in international borrowing are exposed to currency
risk. Van Greuning, Brajovic Bratanovic [90] distinguishes between two types of interna-
tional borrowing namely direct and indirect borrowing. Direct borrowing consists of loans
from foreign banks, export promotion agencies in diﬀerent countries and international
lending agencies. Examples of indirect borrowing includes bank notes and guarantees.
The main reason why banks borrow from the central is that the changes in the required
reserves are eﬀected by the uncertain behaviour of deposit withdrawals. Due to this fact,
the value of bank borrowing has randomness associated with it and therefore it can be
considered stochastic. Fouche, Mukkudem-Petersen, Petersen [46] provides a continuous-
time model for borrowing which plays a key role in deriving an explicit formula for non-risk
weighted assets. They further state that there exist a connection between the return on
bank investments and the dynamics of bank borrowing (see Mukkudem-Petersen, Petersen
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[73]).
Bank Deposits
Bank deposits represents money accepted by banks from the general public such as de-
mand deposits and savings deposits. According to van Greuning, Brajovic Bratanovic
[90] bank deposits constitutes the largest liability of a bank’s balance sheet. In this study
bank deposits is categorized into two types of deposits namely chequeable deposits and
nontransaction deposits. Chequeable deposits are deposit accounts that permit the holder
of the account to write cheques to third parties. Chequeable deposits also includes De-
mand Deposits, Negotiable Order of Withdrawal Accounts (NOW) and Money Market
Deposit Accounts (MMDAs). Demand Deposits are accounts that pay no interest. Ne-
gotiable Order of Withdrawal Accounts (NOW) are accounts that pay interest. Money
Market Deposit Accounts (MMDAs) are high-yielding deposit accounts that restrict the
cheque-writing privileges of the account holder. The advantages of chequeable deposits is
that it allows withdrawals on demand and it is the lowest-cost source of funds. Cheque-
able deposits are costly for banks to maintain since it has to go through the procedure of
setting up monthly statements, processing check and maintain other bank branches.
Nontransaction deposits are the major source of funds for banks. Mishkin [71] states that
nontransaction deposits can be categorized into two types of deposits namely savings ac-
counts and time deposits. Savings accounts are accounts that pay interest and it can be
withdrawn at any time. Time deposits are deposit accounts held for a ﬁxed-term with
the understanding that the depositor can only withdraw by giving written notice.
Mishkin [71] states that when a bank receives additional deposits, it gains an equal amount
of reserves and when it looses deposits, it looses an equal amount of reserves. Therefore,
for all t we have:
dD(t) = dR(t). (1.9)
The banking principle (1.9) plays a key role in the analysis and derivation of certain
banking items such as non risk-weighted assets (see Mukkudem-Petersen, Petersen [46])
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and Mukkudem-Petersen, Petersen [73]).
1.3.3 A Discussion and Brief Literature Review of Bank Regu-
latory Capital
The value of a bank is determined by bank equity and long-term debt. Bank equity is
the diﬀerence between the total assets and total liabilities of the balance sheet. Bank
capital includes reserves that protects banks against the losses from loans and securities.
Fraser, Gup, Kolari [49] deﬁnes bank equity as common stock, surplus and undivided
proﬁts. The value of the common stock and preferred stock is equal to the number of
shares outstanding multiplied by their par value per share. The undivided proﬁts is equal
to the retained earnings which are not paid out as dividends to bank investors. The sum
of these components are collectively known as the book value of equity.
The availability of bank capital inﬂuences the daily operations of banks. Bank capi-
tal also plays an important role when it comes to the safety and soundness of the banking
system. The amount of bank capital determines a bank’s lending capacity. The amount of
capital held by banks is costly therefore it has an impact on a bank’s competitive position
in ﬁnancial markets. In the case where banks experience a shortage of capital or the cost
of holding capital is too high, banks stand the chance of losing business to its competitors.
Van Greuning, Brajovic Bratanovic [90] states that the characteristics of bank capital is
that:
• it should be permanent;
• it should not impose ﬁxed charges against earnings;
• it should allow legal subordination to depositors and creditors.
The key purposes of bank capital is that it acts as a safeguard and stabilizer, thereby
protecting banks against unexpected losses and it addresses the question of capital re-
quirements. From the viewpoint of van Greuning, Brajovic Bratanovic [90] in terms of a
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source of funding, banks require funds to ﬁnance the cost of capital investment in land,
plant and equipment. Well established banks require funds to maintain its operations
and growth in the ﬁnancial markets. The fact that bank capital acts as a buﬀer against
possible losses provides a basis for maintaining conﬁdence in the general public. Bank
regulators and bank shareholders have diﬀerent viewpoints about the adequacy of capital.
Bank regulators expect banks to increase its capital to ensure the stability and soundness
in the event that return on investments are negative. Shareholders expect banks to de-
crease its capital so that it can earn higher rates of return on investments.
A bank’s available capital can be modelled stochastically (see, for instance, Berger, Her-
ring, Szego [21]; Decamps, Rochet, Roger [38]; Dangl, Lehar [36]; Dangl, Zechner [37]; Di-
amond, Rajan [41], Fouche, Mukkudem-Petersen, Petersen [46]; Hancock, Laing, Wilcox
[54]; Hellmann, Murdock, Stiglitz [55]; Leland [63]; Mukkudem-Petersen, Petersen [73];
Mukkudem-Petersen, Petersen [76]; Mukuddem-Petersen, Petersen, Schoeman, Tau [75];
Mukuddem-Petersen, Petersen, Schoeman, Tau [74] and Repullo [84]) with its evolution
being aﬀected by disruptive and unexpected events that are related to the investment
philosophy of shareholders, general state of the economy and proﬁtability of the bank. In
the paper of Fouche, Mukkudem-Petersen, Petersen [46] the equity capital is modelled by
means of a geometric brownian motion. The model will for instance reﬂect positive values
and its increments will follow a log-normal distribution. In Fouche, Mukkudem-Petersen,
Petersen [46] paper the dynamics of Tier 1 Capital is analogous to the description of
the equity capital. The dynamics of the supplementary capital capital is also analogous
to that described for Tier 1 capital. The dynamics of the eligible regulatory capital
(bank capital) is expressed in terms of these diﬀerent types of capital. In the paper of
Mukkudem-Petersen, Petersen [73] the evolution of bank capital is modelled as a diﬀusion
process.
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1.3.4 A Discussion and Brief Literature Review about Total
Risk-weighted Assets
Credit Risk-Weighted Assets
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) (see [10]), observed that over the
last number of years, the world’s largest banks have developed sophisticated systems in
an attempt to model the credit risk arising from important aspects of their business lines.
Credit risk is deﬁned as the potential event of a bank borrower or counter party failing to
meet its obligations in accordance with agreed terms. Banks need to manage the credit
risk inherent in the entire portfolio as well as the risk in individual credits or transactions.
The eﬃcient management of credit risk forms an essential part to the long-term success of
any banking organization. Credit exposures arise when a bank lends money to a customer,
or buys a ﬁnancial asset (for example a commercial bill issued by a company or another
bank), or has any other arrangement with another party that requires that party to pay
money to the bank (for example under a foreign exchange contract). The risks inherent
in a credit exposure are aﬀected by the ﬁnancial strength of the party owing money to the
bank. The greater this is, the more likely it is that the debt will be paid or that the bank
can, if necessary, enforce repayment. Credit risk is also aﬀected by market factors that
impact on the value or cash ﬂow of assets that are used as security for loans. For example,
if a bank has made a loan to a person to buy a house, and taken a mortgage on the house
as security, movements in the property market have an inﬂuence on the likelihood of the
bank recovering all money owed to it. Even for unsecured loans or contracts, market
factors which aﬀect the debtor’s ability to pay the bank can impact on credit risk.
The BCBS (see [10], [14], [18]) proposed two types of broad methodologies for banks
to calculate their capital requirement for credit risk, namely the standardized approach
and the internal ratings based approach (IRB). The standardized and internal ratings
based approaches have been used for the evolution of credit risk management. Under
the standardized approach, banks are required to use ratings from external credit rating
agencies to quantify required capital for credit risk. The internal ratings based approach
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to measure credit risk, requires that changes must be made to the asset values appear-
ing on the bank’s balance sheet. This implies that the diﬀerent categories of the issuing
of bank loans are weighted according to the degree of riskiness it carries. Oﬀ-balance
sheet activities such as foreign exchange trades, servicing a mortgage back-security and
guaranteeing back securities carries credit risk as well. These exposures are converted to
credit equivalent amounts which are also weighted in the same manner as on-balance sheet
credit exposures (for a detail discussion on these methodologies we refer the reader to [18]).
The BCBS (see [10], [14], [18]) states that banks should categorize banking-book expo-
sures into broad classes of assets with diﬀerent underlying risk characteristics. The classes
of assets consist of corporate exposures, sovereign exposures, bank exposures, retail and
equity exposures. The corporate classes are further categorized into 5 sub-classes of spe-
cialized lending that are seperately identiﬁed. The retail asset class is again categorized
into three sub-classes seperately identiﬁed. According to the BCBS the classiﬁcation of
these exposures in such a manner is globally consistent with established bank practices.
The BCBS (see [10]) represents the 15 credit risk exposure types in the following manner:
j = 1 : Project Finance (PF);
j = 2 : Object Finance (OF);
j = 3 : Commodities Finance (CF);
j = 4 : Income Producing Real Estate (IPRE);
j = 5 : Specialized Lending High Volatility Commercial Real Estate (SLHVCRE);
j = 6 : Specialized Lending Not Including
High Volatility Commercially Real Estate (SLNIHVCRE);
j = 7 : Bank Exposure (BE);
j = 8 : Sovereign Exposure (SE);
j = 9 : Retail Residential Mortgage (RRM);
j = 10 : Home Equity Line of Credit (HELOC) ;
j = 11 : Other Retail Exposure (ORE);
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j = 12 : Qualifying Revolving Retail Exposure (QRRE) ;
j = 13 : Small to Medium Size Enterprises with Corporate Treatment (SMECT);
j = 14 : Small to Medium Size Enterprises with Retail Treatment (SMERT);
j = 15 : Equity Exposure Not Held in the Trading Book (EENHTB).
Here 1 ≤ j ≤ 6 and 9 ≤ j ≤ 12 constitute corporate and retail exposures, respectively.
Corporate exposure is deﬁned as a debt obligation of a corporation, partnership, or
proprietorship. The BCBS ([8], see also [9]) argues that an exposure is retail if it satisﬁes
all of the following criteria:
• Exposures to individuals - such as revolving credits and lines of credit (for example
credit cards, overdrafts, and retail facilities secured by ﬁnancial instruments) as
well as personal term loans and leases (for example instalment loans, auto loans
and leases, student and educational loans, personal ﬁnance, and other exposures
with similar characteristics) - are generally eligible for retail treatment regardless
of exposure size, although supervisors may wish to establish exposure thresholds to
distinguish between retail and corporate exposures.
• Residential mortgage loans (including ﬁrst and subsequent clients, term loans and
revolving home equity lines of credit) are eligible for retail treatment regardless of
exposure size as long as the credit is extended to an individual that is an owner oc-
cupier of the property (with the understanding that supervisors exercise reasonable
ﬂexibility regarding buildings containing only a few rental units - otherwise they are
treated as corporate). Loans secured by a single or small number of condominium
or co-operative residential housing units in a single building or complex also fall
within the scope of the residential mortgage category. National supervisors may set
limits on the maximum number of housing units per exposure.
• Loans extended to small businesses and managed as retail exposures are eligible for
retail treatment provided the total exposure of the banking group to a small business
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borrower (on a consolidated basis where applicable) is less than AC 1 million. Small
business loans extended through or guaranteed by an individual are subject to the
same exposure threshold.
• It is expected that supervisors provide ﬂexibility in the practical application of such
thresholds such that banks are not forced to develop extensive new information
systems simply for the purpose of ensuring perfect compliance. It is, however,
important for supervisors to ensure that such ﬂexibility is not being abused.
Precise deﬁnitions for the other credit risk exposures are provided in [18]. The Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (see [18]) further states that banks that have received
approval for using the internal ratings based (IRB) approach subjected to certain condi-
tions and disclosure requirements, may use their own internal approximation method for
risk components in determining the capital requirement for a given exposure. The risk
components for the credit risk categories consists of probability of default (PD) (likelihood
that a loan will not be repaid and fall into default), loss given default (LGD) (it repre-
sents the magnitude of likely loss on the exposure and it is expressed as a percentage),
exposure at default (EAD) (it is a measure of potential exposure expressed as a currency
and calculated by a Basel Credit Risk Model for the period of 1 year or until maturity)
and eﬀective maturity (EM) (eﬀective maturity is measured in years). The derivation of
risk-weighted assets are dependent on the aforementioned risk components. The values
for the risk components PD, LGD, EAD and eﬀective maturity will be denoted by pd,
lgd, ead and em respectively. Probability and loss given default are measured as decimals,
therefore they will take on the values:
0 ≤ pd ≤ 1, 0 ≤ lgd ≤ 1.
Unexpected and Expected Losses for Credit Risk Exposure
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (see [17]) released a document in which
it was describing its movement towards the new capital accord. The BCBS particularly
focused on the possible modiﬁcation and enhancements to the third consultative paper
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based on the public’s comments. The third consultative paper [17] incorporates both the
expected losses (EL) and unexpected losses (UL) into the internal ratings based capi-
tal requirement. The BCBS suggested that a separate treatment of the expected losses
and unexpected losses within the internal ratings based approach (IRB) will result in
an improved, superior and consistent framework. The BCBS expected that under this
new modiﬁed approach, the measurement of the risk-weighted assets would be based only
on the unexpected losses (UL) portion of the IRB calculation. Under this approach a
risk-weighted function (RWF) will transform risk components into risk-weighted assets
and ultimately into capital requirements. Credit risk exposure not in default are cate-
gorized into 7 unexpected loss risk-weighted functions (RWF) for which the calculated
risk-weighted assets can be distinguised. The weighted correlation for the given exposure
is represented as follows:
R = d1w + d2(1− w), (1.10)
where the weight of the given exposure, w, is expressed as follows:
w =
1− exp{Jpd}
1− exp{J} .
The maturity adjustment for the exposure has the form
b = (pA + pB × ln(pd))2.
Following from equation (1.10), a ﬁrm-size adjustment can be made by subtracting
the following quantity for Small to Medium Size Enterprises with Corporate Treatment
(SMECT) and Equity Exposure Not Held in the Trading Book (EENHTB):
0, 04
[
1− S − 5
45
]
provided with the constraint that S1 = 5 ≤ S ≤ S2 = 50. We rewrite equation (1.10) as
R = d1w + d2(1− w)− 0, 04
[
1− S − 5
45
]
,
where S denotes the total annual sales expressed in millions of euros (AC) with values of S
falling in the range of AC 5 million up to AC 50 million . The total annual sales that are less
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than 5 million euros (AC) will be treated as if it were equivalent to the 5 million euros (AC).
The reason why this adjustment is made is to oﬀset the corporate exposure to the Small
to Medium Size Enterprises with Corporate Treatment (SMECT) and Equity Exposure
Not Held in the Trading Book (EENHTB) borrowers. Under the internal ratings based
framework, banks are allowed to distinguish exposure to the aforementioned borrowers.
After considering these components, the capital requirement for the credit risk exposure
may be expressed as follows:
K = lgd
[
N
[√
1
1−RG(pd) + G(0, 9999)
√
R
1−R
]
− pd
][
1 + (m− 2, 5)b
1− 1, 5b
]
,
where N(x) denotes the cumulative distribution function for a standard normal random
variable, that is the probability that a normal random variable X with a mean (μ) = 0
and a variance (σ) = 1 is less than or equal to x. The value x is expressed as follows:
x =
√
1
1− RG(pd) + G(0, 9999)
√
R
1− R,
where G(z) denotes the inverse cumulative function for a standard nomal random variable,
that is the value of x such that G(z) = x. On the next page we provide a schematic
representation of credit risk under the Basel II Accord.
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Figure 1.1: Diagrammatic Overview of Basel II Credit Risk
Market Risk-Weighted Assets
The 1988 Basel Accord, proposed by the BCBS, imposed international capital minimum
requirement guidelines that connects banks’ capital to their credit exposures. This accord
was developed to raise capital ratios, which were generally perceived as being too low and
it was also intended to standardize capital ratios. However, regulators have focused much
on the measurement of credit risk capital charge and ignored market risk as well as other
types of risks. Due to this fact, the BCBS proposed a so-called 1996 Amendment that
extended the 1988 Basel Accord to incorporate risk-based capital requirements for market
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risk that banks are exposed to in their trading accounts. Under this capital accord, banks
are subjected to three capital adequacy requirements namely
• a maximum ratio of assets to capital multiple of 20;
• secondly an 8% minimum ratio of regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets;
• and thirdly a minimum capital charge to make provision for market risk of traded
ﬁnancial derivatives on-and oﬀ-balance sheet activities.
Since banks participate in many trading activities such as swaps and foreign exchange
contracts, they are exposed to the risks resulting from these activities. If the risk that
they are exposed to exceeds 10% of their capital then it needs to be reported on their
trading book. Banks are not allowed to take positions that exceeds 25% of the bank’s
capital without receiving explicit approval from their national or provisional regulator.
Since the incorporation of market risk, the so called 1996 Amendment oﬃcially allowed
banks to use their internal models based on Value-At-Risk models (VaR) methodology to
assess market risk exposure. Value-At-Risk is a numerical procedure to assess the possible
loss that can be incurred by a bank over a given time period and for a given portfolio of
assets. The BCBS [8], deﬁned market risk as the risk of losses in on-and oﬀ-balance sheet
positions arising from movements in market prices.
The BCBS [8] released a consultative document to the amendment to incorporate mar-
ket risk. The two broad methodologies proposed by the BCBS would be allowed to use
only if it is subjected to the approval of national authorities. The standardized method
uses a so-called building block approach in which the capital charge for each diﬀerent
risk category, that is interest rate, equity, foreign exchange and commodity risk, is deter-
mined seperately. These four measures are then added together to obtain a total capital
charge for market risk. According to the BCBS (see [8]) the capital charge for interest
rate and equity risk applies to current market value of items in a bank’s trading book
and the capital charges for foreign exchange and commodity risk applies to a bank’s to-
tal currency and commodity positions. Financial institutions require a wide variety of
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advanced mathematical and computational tools to measure inﬂuence of risk. These in-
stitutions also analyze strategic ways in which they can control and allocate the risk.
The consultative document on incorporating market risk released by the Basel committee
on banking supervision [8] permits these sophisticated ﬁnancial institutions to use their
internal (VaR) models to assess the regulatory capital to protect against the movement of
market prices. The implementation of the internal (VaR) model which is subjected to cer-
tain conditions requires an explicit approval of the national authorities. This alternative
method are subjected to the following conditions:
• certain general criteria concerning the adequacy of the risk management system;
• qualitative standards for internal oversight of the use of models, notably by man-
agement;
• guidelines for specifying an appropriate set of market risk factors (that is, the market
rates and prices that aﬀect the value of the banks’ positions);
• quantitative standards setting out the use of common minimum statistical parame-
ters for measuring risk;
• guidelines for stress testing and validation procedures for external oversight of the
use of models;
• rules for banks which use a mixture of models and the standardised approach.
The general criteria for using internal Value-At-Risk models are outlined as follows:
• risk management practices in banking should be eﬃcient and conceptually sound
and the banking system should be well organised and well structured;
• the bank should have skillful employees that can implement the sophisticated models
not only in the trading area but also in risk control and auditing;
• the sophisticated models should have a great history of generating repeated accurate
reasonable results of measuring risk;
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• the bank will conduct stress testing on a regular basis;
• supervisory authorities will closely monitor and do testing on a bank’s internal
models before it will use it for supervisory capital purposes.
In addition to these general conditions outlined above, banks that want to use their
internal models for capital purposes will be subjected to the conditions outlined in [8].
Fouche, Mukkudem-Petersen, Petersen [46] presents a well-known VaR model used to
describe the capital requirement for market risk. The VaR model that the aforementioned
authors used is presented in the following way:
aˆmp(t) = max[VaR(t ) + d(t)ASR
VaR(t ),
M(t)
1
60
60∑
k=1
VaR((t− k) ) + d(t) 1
60
60∑
k=1
ASRVaR((t− k) )], (1.11)
where
VaR(s) : Value-at-Risk at Time s;
VaR(s ): Value-at-Risk 24 hours before Time s;
d(t) : 0-1 Indicator Function Related to Estimation of Speciﬁc Risk
Measured Through Additional Speciﬁc Risk (ASR) Measure from VaR;
M(t) : Multiplier for Stress Factor, M(t) ≥ 3;
p : Days, 1 ≤ p ≤ 60.
This type of speciﬁc model is commonly used among many banks in the Group-Ten (G-10)
countries. The reason why Fouche, Mukkudem-Petersen, Petersen [46] chose this model
is that it satisﬁed the qualitative standards for the model approach to market risk set out
in [8]. In the sequel, Mukkudem-Petersen, Petersen [72] makes a technical contribution
whereby the aforementioned authors evaluate the total risk-weighted assets using the
internal ratings approach that incorporates Value-At-Risk (VaR) models. Mukkudem-
Petersen, Petersen [72] further provides a description of the capital charge for operational
risk from the viewpoint of the standardised approach (see [15]).
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1.3.5 Discussion and Brief Literature Review about Bank Loans
Merton [69] states that the important functions of banks are money lending to ﬁnancial
institutions and individuals. The bank provides a service to depositors in exchange for
the use of their funds and charges interest on loans. The individual or ﬁrm together with
the bank enters into a ﬁnancial contract and both parties respect the conditions attached
to it. An important and common type of contract, is a loan agreement. In this section
we discuss the process of repaying a loan to a bank.Bank loans constitute the largest
asset in a bank’s balance sheet. Bank loans can be categorized into three types of loans
namely commercial and industrial loans, real estate loans and consumer loans. Commer-
cial and industrial loans are used by businesses to purchase new equipment, acquiring
a variety of goods and raw material. Real estate loans are used for the purchasing of
homes, apartments and oﬃce buildings. Consumer loans are loans made to customers.
The consumer loan can be considered as a credit account that is granted to customers
and not a business. Customers use these loans for own personal needs such as car loans,
home loans and credit cards. Before banks can make loans to customers, they ﬁrst need
to evaluate certain information on the client pertaining to credit worthiness. Obtaining
this information can be costly.
Loan contracts are less complex because the obligation to repay the amount of loans
and the interest on the debt are speciﬁed over the whole duration, that is 0 ≤ t ≤ T ,
of the contract. Loan contracts might be less complex but they certainly lack ﬂexibil-
ity, and for instance, they require costly auditing. Freixas, Rochet [50] mentioned that
models such as Townsend’s costly state veriﬁcation model, further developed by Gale and
Hellwig, develops the idea of how to design an optimal loan contract eﬃciently. In the
aforementioned model asymmetric information are taken into consideration. Asymmet-
ric information occurs when the one party (the borrower) has more or better information
than the other party (the bank). Due to this fact, banks normally charge a higher interest
that reﬂects the average rate of all risk borrowers (see Fraser, Gup and Kolari [49]).
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In the Townsend model the lender cannot observe the investment made by the borrower
unless a costly audit is performed. Thakor [89] also investigated the reasons that led to a
decline in loans relative to security holdings (government bonds). Thakor [89] developed a
model that explores the aforementioned phenomena by considering two key lending func-
tions namely, the prelending screening of loan creditors and postlending monitoring (the
supervision of borrowing’s management on an asset). The Thakor [89] model assumes that
each borrower can approach simultaneous multiple banks. Each bank knows how many
banks the borrower has approached which leads to the idea of symmetric information.
Based on this available information the bank can decide whether it will screen applicants
and then extend the loan. The Thakor [89] model is set up in such a way that the bank
will not lend to a borrower that has not been screened. According to Thakor [89] the idea
behind screening is similar to credit worthiness. His model generates three key results
that are revelant to this study. Thakor [89] states that a small increase in bank risk-based
capital requirements promote the probability of a borrower being denied credit by the
banking system which minimizes aggregate bank lending. Secondly, if a bank agrees to
lend then this can cause an abnormal behaviour in the borrower’s stock price. If a bank
is capital-constrainted then this abnormal behaviour will be greater. Thirdly the eﬀect of
monetary policy on bank lending depends on its eﬀects on the term structure of interest
rates. Thakor [89] further explains the third stage whereby he states that if you increase
the money supply, then the short-term interest rates will reduce more than the long-term
interest rates, the probability of credit-denial by banks will increase which will lead to
the reduction of aggregate bank lending.
Kashyap, Rajan, Stein [61] deﬁnes bank lending as the involvement of acquiring important
information about borrowers and extend credit based on this information. The model of
Kashyap, Rajan, Stein [61] is designed under a framework whereby their model catch the
important activities of a bank. The Kashyap, Rajan, Stein [61] model incorporates the
bank’s participation in providing funds to its customers; raising external ﬁnance (sources
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of funds) unexpectedly is expensive and this implies that the bank should hold a buﬀer
stock of liquid assets to protect themselves from such unpredictable events. The holding
of these liquid assets is also costly.
Loans have the following distinguishing characteristics (see [64]):
• Time to maturity refers to the length of the loan contract. Loans can be categorized
according to their maturity into short-term debt, intermediate-term debt, and long-
term debt. Revolving credit and perpetual debt have no ﬁxed date for retirement.
Revolving credit is a type of credit that does not have a ﬁxed number of payments
(for instance a credit card). Banks allow entities (customers and institutions) to
continuously borrow money up to a certain credit limit whereas a perpetual loan
requires only regular interest payments.
• In the case of a repayment schedule, the payments are made either at the end of
the contract or at set intervals, usually on a monthly, quarterly or semi-annual
basis. This payment is decomposed into a portion of the outstanding principal and
the interest costs. During the loan contract the principal amount of the loan is
amortized. As the principal balance reduces, the interest on the remaining balance
also declines. Interest-only loans do not pay down the principal.
• Interest refers to the cost of borrowing money. Interest rates charged by lending
institutions must be suﬃcient to cover certain costs such as operating costs, admin-
istrative costs, and an acceptable rate of return. Banking interest rates may be ﬁxed
on a loan contract, or adjusted to reﬂect changing market conditions. An example
of the latter is for instance credit contracts where the rates maybe adjusted daily,
annually, or at certain intervals of 2, 6, and 10 years.
Common types of loans
Consumers and small businesses obtain loans with diﬀerent maturity periods to ﬁnance
purchases of real estate, transportation, equipment, supplies, and other needs. These
30
 
 
 
 
entitities may acquire these loans from external sources, including friends and relatives,
banks, credit unions, ﬁnance companies, insurance companies. Small businesses acquire
funds from the the state and federal governments. Here are examples of some common
types of loans.
• Short term loans are loans with a maturity of less than one year (0 < T < 1) and
its purpose is to cover cash shortages resulting from a one-time increase in current
assets, such as a special inventory purchase and an unexpected increase in accounts
receivable. Trade credit is an example of a short term loan.
• Intermediate term loans are loans that are used to ﬁnance the purchase of furniture,
ﬁxtures, vehicles, plant and oﬃce equipment. The maturity of these type of loans
generally runs more than one year but less than ﬁve years, that is 1 ≤ T ≤ 5. An
example of an intermediate term loan are consumer loans for autos, boats and home
repairs.
• Long term loans are loans to be used to for purchasing real estate and are secured
by the asset itself. The maturity on this type of contract generally run between ten
and forty years, that is 10 ≤ T ≤ 40. Mortgage loans are an example of long term
loans.
Companies with good credit and a stable history of revenues, earnings, and cash
ﬂow may use borrowing as a useful strategy, but small businesses should be careful
before committing to large loans in order to avoid cash ﬂow problems and reduced
ﬂexibility. Therefore, in general, small businesses should consider a combination of
loans and other types of ﬁnancing strategies.
The main disadvantage of loans is that they expect, for instance, a small busi-
ness to make regular monthly payments of principal and interest. Small companies
that are in the beginning stages of building, in general, experience shortages in cash
ﬂow that may make such regular payments diﬃcult. Therefore, most ﬁnancial insti-
tutions provide severe penalties for late or missed payments, which may for instance
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include charging late fees and taking possession of collateral. In the case of small
businesses, failing to meet the loan requirements may have an adverse eﬀect on the
company’s credit rating and its ability to obtain external funds. Another disadvan-
tage of loans is that it is often limited to companies that are creditworthy or well
established.
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Chapter 2
Stochastic Banking Model
To understand the operation and management of banks, we have to study its balance
sheet, which records the bank assets (uses of funds) and bank liabilities (sources of funds).
The items on the balance sheet behave in an unpredictable manner which is consistent
with the uncertain behaviour of the activities related to the evolution of reserves, loan
demand, risky and riskless investments, deposits, loan repayments, borrowings and eligible
regulatory capital. Bank capital plays an important role because it balances assets and
liabilities by the relation
Total Assets = Total Liabilities + Bank Capital.
As in Mukkudem-Petersen, Petersen ([73]), a commercial bank’s balance sheet at time t
can be represented as
R(t) + L(t) + M(t) + T (t) = D(t) + B(t) + C(t), (2.1)
where R, L, M, T, D, B and C are reserves, loans to private agents, marketable secu-
rities, treasury securities, deposits, borrowings and bank capital respectively. The Basel
II capital accord allows internal models to be used by banks to measure, for example,
the riskiness of their portfolios and the regulatory capital requirement. Following in this
manner, continuous-time stochastic models have been developed by Diamond and Dybvig
[40], whereby they constructed a model that allows illiquid assets (assets that cannot be
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exchanged to cash) into liquid liabilities. One of the characteristics of bank capital is
that it reduces the probability of a ﬁnancial crisis but reduces the liquidity creation. Dia-
mond and Rajan [41] constructed a model whereby bank assets and liabilities are closely
related. They further argue that bank capital aﬀects three areas namely bank safety, to
reﬁnance at a minimum cost and the ability to liquidate assets. Previous research on
describing stochastic modelling of bank assets has been done by Hancock, Laing, Wilcox
[54] whereby they use VaR techniques to estimate banks’ responses to capital shocks.
The objective in the following section is to provide dynamic continuous-time models for
bank capital and total risk-weighted assets respectively. At the outset we assume that we
work in a probability space (Ω,F ,P) on a time interval 0 ≤ t ≤ T . Here we have that
{F}t≥0 is a complete, right continuous ﬁltration generated by the n-dimensional brownian
motion {X(t)}t≥0. The ﬁltration represent the information available up to a certain time
t. Also P is a probability measure on Ω. We deﬁne the aforementioned bank items:
R : Ω× T → R+ :- Reserves; D : Ω× T → R+ :- Deposits;
L : Ω× T → R+ :- Loans; B : Ω× T → R+ :- Borrowings;
S : Ω× T → R+ :- Securities; C : Ω× T → R+ :- Bank Capital.
2.1 Bank Regulatory Capital
Bank capital are decomposed into Tier 1, Tier 2 and Tier 3 capital. Tier 1 capital con-
sists of equity shares, retained earnings, and non-redeemable, non-cumulative preference
shares. A more detailed discussion on bank regulatory capital can be found on the website
[33]. However for this study we only provide a brief description of the aforementioned
types of capital using the website [33] as our source.
Tier 1 capital is freely available and safeguard banks against unexpected losses. It also
measures a bank’s ﬁnancial strength in the ﬁnancial system. Tier 1 capital or Core capi-
tal is considered the most important because it is common in all banking systems and it
is reported in any bank’s published ﬁnancial statements. Tier 2 capital can be devided
into lower Tier 2 capital and upper Tier 2 capital. Upper Tier 2 capital has no ﬁxed
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maturity, while lower Tier 2 capital has a limited life span, which makes it less eﬀective in
providing a buﬀer against losses by the bank. The upper Tier 2 capital comprises of unau-
dited retained earnings, revaluation reserves, general provisions for bad debts, perpetual
cumulative preference shares (that is preference shares with no maturity date whose div-
idends accrue for future payment even if the bank’s ﬁnancial condition does not support
immediate payment), perpetual subordinated debt (that is debt with no maturity date
which ranks in priority behind all creditors except shareholders). The lower Tier 2 capital
includes subordinated debt with a term of at least 5 years, redeemable preference shares
which may not be redeemed for at least 5 years. Tier 2 capital absorbs losses only in the
event of a winding-up of a bank, and so provides a lower level of protection for depositors
and other creditors. Tier 2 capital plays a major role in the case where Tier 1 capital has
been lost by the banks. The Basel committee on banking supervision [8] introduced the
concept of Tier 3 capital. Tier 3 capital comprises of short term subordinated debt. Tier
3 capital is used to protect banks against the unexpected losses that arise from market
risk if Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital is insuﬃcient for this.
The total of bank capital, C(t), can be expressed as the sum of Tier 1 capital (CT1(t)),
Tier 2 Capital (CT2(t)) and Tier 3 capital (CT3(t)) that is,
C(t) = CT1(t) + CT2(t) + CT3(t) (2.2)
Tier 1 capital is the book value of its stock, E(t), plus retained earnings, Er(t). Tier 2
and Tier 3 capital (collectively known as supplementary capital) is the sum of subordinate
debt, SD(t), and loan-loss reserves, RL(t). As a result, we may set
CT1(t) = E(t) + Er(t) (2.3)
and
CT2(t) + CT3(t) = SD(t) + RL(t). (2.4)
We assume that the bank holds capital in n+1 categories of which n are related to bank
equity. In this case, the market value of subordinate debt at t may be given by
SD(t) = SD(0) exp
{∫ t
0
r0(u)du
}
.
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For the return on the i− th bank equity we have
dei(t) = ei(t)
[(
r0(t) +
n∑
j=1
σij ζ˜j
)
dt +
n∑
j=1
σijdXj(t)
]
, i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Here the co-variance matrix and the market prices of risk, given by
Ψ = (σij)
n
i,j=1 and ζ˜ = (ζ1, . . . , ζn)
′
,
respectively, are assumed to be constant.
2.1.1 Dynamics of Bank Regulatory Capital
At time t, we assume that the bank capital is continuously being consumed by loans
to private agents and marketable securities at the rate of pa(t) = pa¯(t)dt, so that loan
consumption is a constant proportion, p, of such assets. Assuming no transaction costs,
we may compute the total bank capital as
C(t) = E(t) + Er(t) + SD(t) + RL(t). (2.5)
Because of their non-dynamic nature we do not consider retained earnings and loan-loss
reserves to be active constituents of bank capital (see Mukkudem-Petersen, Petersen [76]).
Therefore, in the case where
dEr(t) = dRL(t) = 0, for all t,
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the C-dynamics may be expressed as
dC(t) = C(t)
n∑
i=1
πi(t)
dei(t)
ei(t)
+
(
1−
n∑
i=1
πi(t)
)
C(t)
dSD(t)
SD(t)
− pa¯(t)dt
= C(t)
n∑
i=1
πi(t)
[
(r0(t) +
n∑
j=1
σij ζ˜j) dt +
n∑
j=1
σij dXj(t)
]
+
(
1−
n∑
i=1
πi(t)
)
C(t)
[
r0(t)dt
]
− pa¯(t)dt
= C(t)
n∑
i=1
πi(t)
[
r0(t)dt +
n∑
j=1
σij ζ˜jdt +
n∑
j=1
σij dXj(t)
]
+C(t)r0(t)dt− C(t)
n∑
i=1
πi(t)r0(t)dt− pa¯(t)dt
= C(t)
n∑
i=1
πi(t)r0(t)dt + C(t)
n∑
i=1
πi(t)
n∑
j=1
σij ζ˜jdt +
C(t)
n∑
i=1
πi(t)
n∑
j=1
σij dXj(t) + C(t)r0(t)dt− C(t)
n∑
i=1
πi(t)r0(t)dt− pa¯(t)dt
= C(t)
[( n∑
i=1
πi(t)
n∑
j=1
σij ζ˜j + r0(t)
)
dt +
n∑
i=1
πi(t)
n∑
j=1
σij dXj(t)
]
− pa¯(t)dt
= C(t)
[(
r0(t) + π
′
(t)Ψζ˜
)
dt + π
′
(t)ΨdX(t)
]
− pa¯(t)dt, (2.6)
where π
′
(t) are the proportions invested in the risky assets (bank equities). The diﬀusion
term π
′
(t)ΨdX(t) in (2.6) establishes a correlation between bank capital and total risk-
weighted assets.
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2.2 Total-Risk Weighted Assets
2.2.1 Continuous-time model of the Total Risk-Weighted Assets
Continuous-time models for total risk-weighted assets have been proposed by Fouche,
Mukkudem-Petersen, Petersen [46] (see also Mukkudem-Petersen, Petersen [76]). In the
said paper the total risk-weighted assets is calculated by multiplying the capital charges for
market and operational risk by 12, 5 (the percentage of the reciprocal of capital adequacy
ratio) and adding the result to the sum of risk-weighted assets for credit risk. Section
(1.3.4) suggests that risk-weighted assets (RWAs) are deﬁned by placing each on- and
oﬀ-balance item into a risk category. In this regard, the riskier the asset the higher the
risk-weight. It is clear that RWAs are a weighted average of the various assets of the
bank. In the sequel, our primary objective is to provide a coherent analysis of these
issues in a simpliﬁed framework. In this regard, we introduce table (7.1) (see Appendix
A) that provides illustrative risk categories, their risk-weights and representative items in
an on-balance sheet context. For sake of argument, in the ensuing discussion, we restrict
ourselves to the information contained in table (7.1). According to this table, the balance
sheet assets, viz., reserves, R(t), and treasuries, T (t), have a zero risk-weighting so that,
in our case, the TRWAs are solely constituted by loans to private agents, L, and 20% of
marketable securities, M. This means that we are mainly concerned about the eﬀect of
credit and market risk in the formulation of the risk-based CAR. Suppose that L is the
credit RWAs for which
dL(t) = L(t)
{
a(t)
L(t)
[(
r(t) + μL(t)
)
dt +
n∑
j=1
σjdXj(t)
]}
and a0 is the market RWAs with dynamics
da0(t) = a0(t)
{
a(t)
a0(t)
[
μ0(t)dt + σ0dX0(t)
]}
, a0 = 0, 2M.
In this case, the TRWAs, a, are expressible as
a(t) = L(t) + a0(t)
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with dynamics given by
da(t) = a(t)
[(
r(t) + μ(t)
)
dt + σ0dX0(t) +
n∑
j=1
σjdXj(t)
]
, a0 = a(t0), (2.7)
where μ(t) = μL(t)+μ0(t) is a deterministic function of time. Here X0(t) is standard Brow-
nian motion that is independent of X1(t), . . . , Xn(t) and we deﬁne σ = (σ1, . . . , σn)
′
,
where the σj ’s are constants. The volatility σ allows for a possible correlation between
the TRWAs (consisting of credit and market RWAs) and bank regulatory capital. As-
suming that a is completely hedgeable, under the risk-neutral measure Q, the a-dynamics
previously given by (2.7), may be rewritten as
da(t) = a(t)
[(
r(t) + μ(t)−
n∑
j=1
σjθj
)
dt +
n∑
j=1
σjdX̂j(t)
]
, j = 1, . . . , n. (2.8)
This implies that
a(τ) = a(t) exp
{∫ τ
t
(
r(s) + μ(s)
)
ds−
n∑
j=1
σj
(
θj +
1
2
σj
)
(τ − t)
+
n∑
j=1
σj
(
X̂j(τ)− X̂j(t)
)}
. (2.9)
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Chapter 3
Amortizations
The objective of this chapter is to derive an explicit amortization function via a general
pricing equation and a martingale approach. The amortization function has to satisfy the
partial diﬀerential equation under certain conditions. The main reason for this approach
is to illustrate that this should be seen as a possible starting point for obtaining more
sophisticated and complex alternative amortization functions.
Amortization is the process of paying oﬀ a debt with interest over a period of time.
The choice of amortization functions determines the overall loan structure of a bank.
A bank loan is a ﬁnancial contract between two parties, a lender (the bank) and borrower
(the debtor) that has the features outlined below.
At time t = 0, the bank pays an amount of money to the borrower S(0), called the
principal, and the borrower pays back or amortizes the loan. We let A(t) denote the
total amount of money paid back and call it the amortization function, with t as the
variable (see Norberg [79]). An amortization function is a ﬁnite-valued, right-continuous,
non-decreasing function and A(0) = 0. The type of amortization function considered here
is a non-negative function deﬁned on the real line, that is:
A(t) : [0,∞)→ [0,∞)
where [0,∞) denotes the set of non-negative real numbers. The borrower (debtor) pays
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amortizations back to the bank at an interest rate of r, which is inﬂuenced by the uncer-
tainty of the market conditions. In a scenario like this, the total amount of amortization
repayments at time t ≥ 0 at rate r will be denoted by, A(t, r(t)). When accounting and
taxation are taken into account, then the loan contract needs to be designed in such a
way that the amortization function, A(t, r(t)), is decomposed into repayments and interest
(see Norberg [79] for instance). In this case, A(t, r(t)) may be presented as
A(t, r(t)) = F (t, r(t)) + I(t, r(t)), (3.1)
where F is the loan repayment and I is the interest function of time, both being non-
negative, right-continuous and non-decreasing with the constraint conditions F (0) =
I(0, r(0)) = 0 and F (n) = 1. The repayments should be fractions of the principal, that
is, F (t) ≤ 1, and a ﬁnite term loan should be repaid in full, that is, F (T ) = 1. The term
of the loan contract is deﬁned as
T = inf{t; A(t) = A∞}. (3.2)
The bank loan is said to be perpetual if T = ∞. The bank may choose to ﬁx the interest
rate or adapt it to the market conditions. In this study, we will let the interest rate be
of a stochastic nature, that is, the interest rate will be inﬂuenced by unexpected events.
The interest rate is speciﬁed in such a way as to be non-negative and usually the term
of the contract is ﬁnite, that is, 0 ≤ t ≤ T . However, the situation where the borrower
(debtor) pays the loan of the principal S(0) forever may occur, and is represented by∫ ∞
0
r(s) ds = ∞. (3.3)
The amortizations are designed in a such a way that its present value at time 0 will be
equal to the principal. The principal will be set to one monetary unit so that S(0) = 1.
The loan that will be paid back therefore satisﬁes the condition∫ T
0
exp
(
−
∫ τ
0
r(s) ds
)
dA(τ) = S(0) = 1. (3.4)
The following observation come from Norberg [79]. We present it formally and in more
detail.
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Proposition 3.0.1 In the given scenario, at any time t the remaining principal is
1− F (t) =
∫ T
t
exp
(
−
∫ τ
t
r(s) ds
)
dA(τ). (3.5)
Proof.
Inserting A(t, r(t)) = F (t, r(t)) + I(t, r(t)) into
∫ T
0
exp
(
− ∫ τ
0
r(s) ds
)
dA(τ) yields the
following∫ T
0
exp
(
−
∫ τ
0
r(s) ds
)
dI(τ) +
∫ T
0
exp
(
−
∫ τ
0
r(s) ds
)
dF (τ) = 1.
Now by applying the technique of stochastic integration by parts, on the term exp
(
−∫ τ
0
r(s)ds
)
dF (τ), we obtain the following result:
exp
(
−
∫ τ
0
r(s)ds
)
(1− F (t)) = 1−
∫ t
0
exp
(
−
∫ τ
0
r(s)ds
)
(1− F (τ))r(s)dτ
−
∫ t
0
exp
(
−
∫ τ
0
r(s)ds
)
dF (τ).
Analysing the ﬁrst case where it is at the end of the term of the contract, that is, t = T ,
and using the condition that the loan is repaid, F (T ) = 1, we have the following
exp
(
−
∫ τ
0
r(s)ds
)
(1− 1) = 1−
∫ t
0
exp
(
−
∫ τ
0
r(s)ds
)
(1− F (τ))r(s)dτ
−
∫ t
0
exp
(
−
∫ τ
0
r(s)ds
)
dF (τ).
Rearranging the terms in the following manner:∫ t
0
exp
(
−
∫ τ
0
r(s)ds
)
(1− F (τ))r(s)dτ +
∫ t
0
exp
(
−
∫ τ
0
r(s)ds
)
dF (τ) = 1.
Analysing the case when T = ∞, that is, a perpetual loan and using the fact that∫ τ
0
r(s)ds = ∞, the following is derived:
exp
(
−
∫ τ
0
r(s)ds
)
(1− F (t)) = 1− A (3.6)
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where A is expressed as:
A = 1−
∫ t
0
exp
(
−
∫ τ
0
r(s)ds
)
(1− F (τ))r(s)dτ −
∫ t
0
exp
(
−
∫ τ
0
r(s)ds
)
dF (τ).
Now also re-arranging the terms in a similar manner as above, the following is obtained:∫ t
0
exp
(
−
∫ τ
0
r(s) ds
)
(1− F (τ))r(s)dτ +
∫ t
0
exp
(
−
∫ τ
0
r(s)ds
)
dF (τ) = 1.
Comparing by inspection the term for the interest function is identical to the term for the
outstanding loan∫ T
0
exp
(
−
∫ τ
0
r(s)ds
)
dI(τ) =
∫ t
0
exp
(
−
∫ τ
0
r(s)ds
)
(1− F (τ))r(s)dτ. (3.7)
The equality (3.7) states that the discounted value of all interest payments is identical to
the discounted value of all interest amounts arising from the outstanding balance. The
above equality is only satisﬁed if
dI(t) = (1− F (t))r(t)dt. (3.8)
Diﬀerential equation (3.8) above states that interest is paid currently and instantaneously
on the outstanding balance, 1−F (t), on the interval [t, t+ δt). Under the natural interest
rate scheme the diﬀerential equation
dA(t, r(t)) = dF (t, r(t)) + dI(t, r(t))
= dF (t, r(t)) + (1− F (t))r(t)dt (3.9)
establishes a one-to-one relationship between the amortizations and the repayments. In-
tegrating the equation (3.9) over (0, t] to obtain
A(t, r(t)) = F (t, r(t)) +
∫ t
0
(1− F (τ))r(τ)dτ. (3.10)
Multiplying exp
(
− ∫ τ
0
r(s)ds
)
with equation (3.6) yields:
exp
(
−
∫ τ
0
r(s)ds
)
(1− F (t)) = exp
(
−
∫ τ
0
r(s)ds
)
×
{
A
}
. (3.11)
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This implies that equation (3.7) takes the form
1− F (t) = exp
(
−
∫ τ
0
r(s)ds
){
1−
∫ t
0
exp
(
−
∫ τ
0
r(s)ds
)
dA(τ)
}
. (3.12)
The equality (3.12) implies that the remaining principal is the value of the diﬀerence
between the principal and the paid amortizations provided that all the amounts are com-
pounded with interest. Therefore the remaining principal may be represented as follows:
1− F (t) =
∫ T
t
exp
(
−
∫ τ
t
r(s)ds
)
dA(τ). (3.13)
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3.1 The Partial Diﬀerential Equation Approach for
Amortization
In order to derive an alternative amortization function, we provide a systematic procedure
whereby we use the partial diﬀerential equation approach to obtain bond prices. This
approach has been proposed by Vasicek [91] (see also Baz, Chacko [20] and Cairns [31]).
The following assumptions are made for deriving an amortization function.
3.1.1 Conditions for deriving the amortization function
1. r(t) should be a markovian process with normally distributed increments and should
be a continuous function of time;
2. At a certain time t, the value of a amortization function, A(t, r(t), T ), which matures
at the end of a contract is fully determined by the time assessment of {r(s) : t ≤
s ≤ T};
3. the market is eﬃcient, that is, we assume no transaction cost and all investors are
rational.
Under these assumptions, we may express the amortization function as follows:
A(t, r(t)) = A(t, r(t), T ).
Baz, Chacko [20] derives the general pricing equation but it is not discussed in detail.
Therefore we follow a similar discussion from Cairns [31]; Mamon [68] and Wilmott,
Howison, Dewynne [93]. We derive the general pricing equation using two alternative
methods namely the traditional approach (see Wilmott, Howison, Dewynne [93]) and via
the martingale approach (see Mamon [68]).
Applying Itoˆ’s formula to the amortization function A(t, r(t), T ) and making use of the
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stochastic diﬀerential equation dr(t) = μ(r, t)dt+ σ(r, t)dX(t) we have
dA(t, r(t), T ) =
∂A(t, r(t), T )
∂t
dt +
∂A(t, r(t), T )
∂r
dr +
1
2
∂2A(t, r(t), T )
∂r2
d〈r〉
=
∂A
∂t
dt +
∂A
∂r
(
μ(r, t)dt + σ(r, t)dX
)
+
1
2
∂2A
∂r2
dt
=
[
∂A
∂t
+ μ
∂A
∂r
+
1
2
σ2
∂2A
∂r2
]
dt + σ
∂A
∂t
dX(t).
So the dynamics of the amortization function can be expressed as
dA(t, r(t), T ) = A(t, r(t), T )
[
a(t, r(t), T )dt+ b(t, r(t), T )dX(t)
]
(3.14)
where
a(t, r(t), T ) =
1
A
[
∂A
∂t
+ μ
∂A
∂r
+
1
2
σ2
∂2A
∂r2
]
(3.15)
and
b(t, r(t), T ) =
1
A
σ
∂A
∂r
. (3.16)
In practice, the pricing of bonds is more diﬃcult than the pricing of option contracts since
there are no underlying assets to hedge it with. For example you cannot go and ”buy”
an interest rate of 4% or 6%. Due to this reason one way of hedging is to construct a
self-ﬁnancing portfolio containing two bonds with diﬀerent maturity dates, T1 and T2. In
order to do this we follow a method to the analysis by Wilmott, Howison, Dewynne [93]
in constructing the hedging portfolio and we obtain the following result.
Proposition 3.1.1 Under the conditions (3.1.1) above, the amortization function satis-
ﬁes the following partial diﬀerential equation:
∂A(t, r(t), T )
∂t
+
∂A(t, r(t), T )
∂r
[μ(r, t)− λ(r, t)σ(r, t)]
+
1
2
∂2A(t, r(t), T )
∂r2
σ2(r, t) = r(t)A(t, r(t), T ) (3.17)
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Proof.
Consider two loans where one loan maturing at T1 has a price A1(r(t), t) and the other
loan maturing at T2 has a price A2(r(t), t), respectively. Holding the ﬁrst loan and a
multiple −Δ of the other loan, the portfolio Λ has the form
Λ = A1(r(t), t)−ΔA2(r(t), t).
Applying Itoˆ’s formula (1.3) to the functions A1(r(t), t) and A2(r(t), t), the change in the
portfolio over the interval (t, t + dt] is
dΛ =
∂A1(r(t), t)
∂t
dt +
∂A1(r(t), t)
∂r
dr +
1
2
σ2
∂2A1(r(t), t)
∂r2
dt
−Δ
(
∂A2(r(t), t)
∂t
dt +
∂A2(r(t), t)
∂r
dr +
1
2
σ2
∂2A2(r(t), t)
∂r2
)
dt. (3.18)
Choosing Δ =
∂A1(r(t), t)
∂r
/
∂A2(r(t), t)
∂r
we see that the random term vanishes from the
dynamics of the portfolio (3.18), thus we have
dΛ =
(
∂A1(r(t), t)
∂t
+
1
2
σ2
∂2A1(r(t), t)
∂r2
−∂A1(r(t), t)
∂r
/
∂A2(r(t), t)
∂r
(
∂A2(r(t), t)
∂t
+
1
2
σ2
∂2A2(r(t), t)
∂r2
))
dt
= r
(
A1(r(t), t)− ∂A1(r(t), t)
∂r
/
∂A2(r(t), t)
∂r
A2(r(t), t)
)
dt
= rΛdt
where we have use arbitrage arguments to set the return on the portfolio equal to the
risk-free interest rate. Grouping all A1(r(t), t) terms on the left-hand side and all the
A2(r(t), t) terms on the right-hand side we obtain(
∂A1(r(t), t)
∂t
+
1
2
σ2
∂2A1(r(t), t)
∂r2
− rA1(r(t), t)
)/
∂A1(r(t), t)
∂r
=(
∂A2(r(t), t)
∂t
+
1
2
σ2
∂2A2(r(t), t)
∂r2
− rA2(r(t), t)
)/
∂A2(r(t), t)
∂r
. (3.19)
This is an equation in two unknowns namely A1(r(t), t) and A2(r(t), t). The left-hand
side of equation (3.19) is a function of T1 but not of T2 and the righ-hand side of equation
(3.19) is a function of T2 but not of T1. The only way for equation (3.19) to hold is for
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both sides to be independent of the expiry date. Therefore eliminating the subscripts
from A1(r(t), t) and A2(r(t), t) we have(
∂A(r(t), t)
∂t
+
1
2
σ2
∂2A(r(t), t)
∂r2
− rA(r(t), t)
)/
∂A(r(t), t)
∂r
= a(r(t), t)
for some function a(r(t), t). We write
a(r(t), t) = σ(r(t), t)λ(r(t), t)− μ(r(t), t).
For a given σ(r(t), t) (not identically zero) and μ(r(t), t) this is always possible. The
function λ(r(t), t) is known as the market price of risk.
The general pricing equation for determining an amortization function is as follows:
∂A(t, r(t), T )
∂t
+
∂A(t, r(t), T )
∂r
[
μ(r, t)− λ(r, t)σ(r, t)
]
+
1
2
∂2A(t, r(t), T )
∂r2
σ2(r, t) = r(t)A(t, r(t), T ).
We are now in a position to interpret the market price of risk λ(r(t), t). Suppose we
choose to hold just one loan with maturity date T instead of holding the hedged portfolio
constructed above. Then the value of the loan changes over the interval (t, t + dt] by
dA = σ
∂A(r(t), t)
∂r
dX(t) +
(
∂A(r(t), t)
∂t
+
1
2
σ2
∂2A(r(t), t)
∂r2
+ μ
∂A(r(t), t)
∂r
)
dt. (3.20)
From the general pricing equation (3.17) the value of the loan changes to
dA = σ
∂A(r(t), t)
∂r
dX(t) +
(
σλ
∂A(r(t), t)
∂r
+ rA(r(t), t)
)
dt,
dA− rAdt = σ∂A(r(t), t)
∂r
(
dX(t) + λdt
)
. (3.21)
The existence of the random term dX (a Wiener process) shows that the hedge portfolio
is not riskless. The right-hand side of expression (3.21) is the excess return above the
risk-free interest rate for accepting a certain level of risk. Wilmott, Howison, Dewynne
[93] states that by taking on the extra risk the portfolio proﬁts by an extra λdt per unit
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of extra risk.
Obtaining the amortization function from the general pricing equation (3.17) we will be
following a similar procedure proposed by Mamon [68]. Mamon [68] propose three ways
to derive bond prices (in our case an amortization function) in the Vasicek interest rate
model. In the ﬁrst case the bond price is derived based on the short rate distribution. In
the second case the bond price is obtained by solving the general pricing equation (3.17)
and thirdly the price of the bond is obtained within the Heath-Jarrow-Morton framework
(HJM).
Vasicek [91] proposed the dynamics of the risk free interest rate as follows:
dr(t) = α(γ − r(t))dt + σdX˜(t), (3.22)
where X˜(t) is a standard brownian motion under the risk-neutral measure Q and α, γ and
σ are all constants with α > 0. The drift term α(γ−r(t)) has the property of being mean
reverting, that is, the short term interest rate is pulled back to its long-term mean, γ, and
σ represents the volatility of the interest rate. The adjustment parameter, α, determines
how quickly the interest rate r(t) converge to its long-term mean γ. Therefore the higher
the value of α, the closer the interest rate r(t) will be to the average mean. The interest
rate process (3.22) is characterised as an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process which means that it
is characterised by stationary distribution. The aformentioned model is deﬁned as a term
structure model having the characteristics that the interest rate r(t) is autoregressive,
that is r(t) cannot drift oﬀ to +∞ or −∞ or to 0, but will eventually be pulled back to
some long-term target and by deriving simple formulae for bond prices (in this case an
amortization function). The explicit solution to the stochastic diﬀerential equation (3.22)
is given by
r(t) = exp
(
− αt
)[
r(0) +
∫ t
0
αγ exp
(
αu
)
du + σ
∫ t
0
exp
(
αu
)
dX(u)
]
. (3.23)
Expression (3.23) can be obtained by using Itoˆ’s formula.
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3.2 The Martingale Approach
Under the martingale-oriented approach (see Mamon [68]) the derivation is based on the
assumption that ru is a markovian process. In practice this means that determining the
future value of r(u) = ru solely depends on the current value r(t) = rt where t ≤ u ≤ T
and the knowledge of its past is irrelevant. However, we point out that in the following
proposition we only derive the partial diﬀerential equation under a martingale approach.
We derive the amortization function in section 3.3. Therefore we avoid the computation
of the function in the following proposition since both proposition 3.2.1 and proposition
3.3.1 will derive the resulting amortization function in a similar fashion.
Proposition 3.2.1 Suppose that ru is a markov diﬀusion process and under the measure
Q, ru satisﬁes the stochastic diﬀerential equation dr(ru, u) = μ(ru, u)du + σ(ru, u)dX˜u
where X˜u is a standard brownian motion and by the Feynman-Kac formula the amortiza-
tion function is expressed as
A(t, rt, T ) = E˜Q
[
exp
(
−
∫ T
t
rudu
)∣∣∣∣rt]
and ru is given by
ru = exp
(
− α(u− t)
)[
rt + γ
(
exp
(
α(u− t)
)
− 1
)
+ σ
∫ u
t
exp
(
α(s− t)
)
dXs
]
.
Then the amortization function satisﬁes the following partial diﬀerential equation
∂A(t, r(t), T )
∂t
+
∂A(t, r(t), T )
∂r
[μ(r, t)− λ(r, t)σ(r, t)]
+
1
2
∂2A(t, r(t), T )
∂r2
σ2(r, t) = r(t)A(t, r(t), T ). (3.24)
Proof.
The symbol E˜Q represents the expectation operator under the risk neutral measure Q.
Since rt is a parameter we can obtain the partial derivative of ru with respect to rt as
follows
∂ru
∂rt
= exp
(
− α(u− t)
)
. (3.25)
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Integrating equation (3.25) yields∫ T
t
∂ru
∂rt
du =
∫ T
t
exp
(
− α(u− t)
)
du
=
1
α
(
1− exp
(
− α(T − t)
))
,
which is deterministic. Taking the partial derivative of the Amortization function A(t, rt, T )
with respect to the interest rate rt we obtain
∂A(t, rt, T )
∂rt
= E˜Q
[
−
(∫ T
t
∂ru
∂rt
du
)
exp
(
−
∫ T
t
rudu
)]
= − 1
α
(
1− exp
(
− α(T − t)
))
E˜Q
[
exp
(
−
∫ T
t
rudu
)]
= −D(t, T )A(t, rt, T ).
Thus,
∂A
∂rt
= −D(t, T )A(t, rt, T ). So we have,
A(t, rt, T ) = C(t, T ) exp
(
−D(t, T )rt
)
,
for some unknown function C(t, T ) independent of rt. Consider
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
rudu
)
A(t, r(t), T ) = exp
(
−
∫ t
0
rudu
)
E˜Q
[
exp
(
−
∫ T
t
rudu
)∣∣∣∣Ft]
= E˜Q
[
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
rudu
)
exp
(
−
∫ T
t
rudu
)∣∣∣∣Ft]
= E˜Q
[
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
rudu−
∫ T
t
rudu
)∣∣∣∣Ft]
= E˜Q
[
exp
(
−
∫ T
0
rudu
)∣∣∣∣Ft].
The expression above is a Q-martingale by the tower property. Applying Itoˆ’s formula
(1.3) and writing it in integral form, we obtain the following
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
rudu
)
A(t, rt, T ) = A(0, r0, T ) +
∫ t
0
−ru exp
(
−
∫ u
0
rsds
)
A(u, ru, T )du
+
∫ t
0
exp
(
−
∫ u
0
rsds
)
∂
∂u
A(u, ru, T )du
+
∫ t
0
exp
(
−
∫ u
0
rsds
)
∂
∂ru
A(u, ru, T )(dr)
+
1
2
∫ t
0
exp
(
−
∫ u
0
rsds
)
∂2
∂r2u
A(u, ru, T )σ
2du
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where the expression dr = μ(ru, u)du+σ(ru, u)dXu is the general form for continuous-time
interest rate models. In terms of the vasicek model μ(ru, u) = α(γ− ru) and σ(ru, u) = σ.
Since the expression above is a martingale, all the du terms must sum to zero. Therefore,
−rtA(t, rt, T ) + ∂
∂t
A(t, rt, T ) +
∂
∂rt
A(t, rt, T )(μ(ru, u))
+
σ2
2
∂2
∂r2t
A(t, rt, T ) = 0. (3.26)
3.3 Analytical solution for the amortization function
We are now in the position to formulate a proposition for obtaining an explicit formula for
the amortization function (see Cairns [31], Mamon [68] for deriving the partial diﬀerential
equation and the martingale approach).
Proposition 3.3.1 Suppose that the interest rate is modelled by the following stochastic
diﬀerental equation
dr(t) = α(γ − r(t))dt + σdX˜(t),
the market price of risk λ(μ, σ) = λ is constant and given the condition A(t, r(t), T ) =
S(0) = 1 where the amortization function satisﬁes the partial diﬀerential equation (3.17)
then the amortization function has the form
A(t, r(t), T ) = exp
{
C(t, T )−D(t, T )r(t)
}
, (3.27)
= exp
{(
γ +
σλ
α
− σ
2
2α2
)[
1
α
(
1− exp
(
− α(T − t)
))
− (T − t)
]
− σ
2
4α3
(
1− exp
(
− α(T − t)
))2
− 1
α
(
1− exp
(
− α(T − t)
))
r(t)
}
.
Proof.
Solving equation (3.17) we need to specify the parameters of the Vasicek interest rate
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model, deﬁne the market price of risk, λ(r, t) and apply the condition A(t, r(t), T ) =
S(0) = 1.
In terms of the Vasicek model we deﬁne, μ(r, t) = α(γ − r); σ(r, t) = σ and λ(r, t) = λ.
Therefore the general pricing equation becomes:
∂A(t, r(t), T )
∂t
+
∂A(t, r(t), T )
∂r
[α(γ − r)− λσ]
+
1
2
∂2A(t, r(t), T )
∂r2
σ2(r, t) = r(t)A(t, r(t), T )
subject to the condition A(r(t), T, T ) = 1 for a loan with the principal S(0) = 1 (Baz,
Chacko [20]). We guess an amortization function having the form:
A(t, r(t), T ) = C(t, T ) exp
{
−D(t, T )r(t)
}
(3.28)
for some unknown functions C(t, T ) and D(t, T ). Obtaining partial derivatives of equation
(3.28) yields:
∂A(t, r(t), T )
∂t
=
dC(t, T )
dt
exp
{
−D(t, T )r(t)
}
− rC(t, T )dD(t, T )
dt
exp
{
−D(t, T )r(t)
}
;
∂A(t, r(t), T )
∂r
= −C(t, T )D(t, T ) exp
{
−D(t, T )r(t)
}
;
∂2A(t, r(t), T ))
∂r2
= C(t, T )D(t, T )2 exp
{
−D(t, T )r(t)
}
.
Substituting the partial derivatives into the general pricing equation (3.17) yields:
dC(t, T )
dt
exp
{
−D(t, T )r(t)
}
− rC dD(t, T )
dt
exp
{
−D(t, T )r(t)
}
−(α(γ − r) + λσ)CD exp
{
−D(t, T )r(t)
}
+
1
2
σ2CD2 exp
{
−D(t, T )r(t)
}
− rC exp
{
−D(t, T )r(t)
}
= 0.
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Cancelling the factor exp
{
−D(t, T )r(t)
}
and rearranging the terms we have
dC(t, T )
dt
− rC dD(t, T )
dt
− (α(γ − r) + λσ)CD + 1
2
σ2CD2 − rC = 0
dC(t, T )
dt
− (αγ + σλ)CD + 1
2
σ2CD2 = rC + rC
dD(t, T )
dt
− αrCD
= rC(1 +
dD(t, T )
dt
− αD), (3.29)
where the notation C and D represents C(t, T ) and D(t, T ) respectively. Since the right-
hand side of expression (3.29) is a function of the interest rate r and the left-hand side is
a function of t and T only then the following must hold:
dC(t, T )
dt
− (αγ + σλ)CD + 1
2
σ2CD2 = 0 (3.30)
and
(1 +
dD(t, T )
dt
− αD) = 0. (3.31)
Equations (3.30) and (3.31) are both seperable ordinary diﬀerential equations. Solving
equation (3.31) with boundary condition D(T, T ) = 0 we obtain the following
D(t, T ) =
1
α
(
1− exp
(
− α(T − t)
))
.
The reason for specifying the conditions in such a manner follows from the fact
that A(T, r(t), T ) = 1, therefore:
C(T, T ) exp
{
−D(t, T )r(t)
}
= 1 ∀t. (3.32)
Solving for C(t, T ) with boundary condition C(T, T ) = 1 yields the following:
dC(t, T )
dt
− (αγ + σλ)CD + 1
2
σ2CD2 =
dC(t, T )
dt
− CDαγ − σλCD + 1
2
σ2CD2
=
dC(t, T )
dt
+ CD(
1
2
σ2D − αγ − σλ)
=
dC(t, T )
dt
+
σ2
2
CD2 − (αγ + σλ)CD
=
dC(t, T )
C
+
σ2
2
D2 − (αγ + σλ)Ddt = 0.
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Integrating over a time interval (t, T ] and let dζ = dt observe the following:
∫ T
t
1
C
dC +
σ2
2α2
∫ T
t
(
1− exp
(
− α(T − ζ)
))2
dζ −(
γ +
σλ
α
)∫ T
t
(
1− exp
(
− α(T − ζ)
))
dζ = 0
⇒ lnC(T, T )− lnC(t, T ) + σ
2
2α2
[
ζ − 2
α
exp
(
− α(T − ζ)
)
+
1
2α
exp
(
− 2α(T − ζ)
)]ζ=T
ζ=t
−(γ + σλ
α
)
[
ζ − 1
α
exp
(
− α(T − ζ)
)]ζ=T
ζ=t
= 0
⇒ lnC(T, T )− lnC(t, T ) + σ
2
2α2
[
T − 2
α
+
1
2α
− t + 2
α
exp
(
− α(T − t)
)
− 1
2α
exp
(
− 2α(T − t)
)]
−
(
γ +
σλ
α
)[
T − t− 1
α
+
1
α
exp
(
− α(T − t)
)]
= 0
⇒ lnC(T, T )− lnC(t, T ) + σ
2
2α2
[
T − t− 2
α
(
1− exp
(
− α(T − t)
))
+
1
2α
(
1− exp
(
− 2α(T − t)
))]
−
(
γ +
σλ
α
)[
T − t− 1
α
(
1− exp
(
− α(T − t)
))]
= 0
since C(T, T ) = 1:
lnC(t, T ) =
σ2
2α2
[
T − t− 2
α
(
1− exp
(
− α(T − t)
))
+
1
2α
(
1− exp
(
− 2α(T − t)
))]
−
(
γ +
σλ
α
)[
T − t− 1
α
(
1− exp
(
− α(T − t)
))]
=
(
γ +
σλ
α
− σ
2
2α2
)[
1
α
(
1− exp
(
− α(T − t)
))
− (T − t)
]
− σ
2
4α3
(
1− exp
(
− α(T − t)
))2
. (3.33)
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The amortization function may now be represented as follows:
A(r(t), t, T ) = exp
{(
γ +
σλ
α
− σ
2
2α2
)[
1
α
(
1− exp
(
− α(T − t)
))
− (T − t)
]
− σ
2
4α3
(
1− exp
(
− α(T − t)
))2}
×
exp
{
− 1
α
(
1− exp
(
− α(T − t)
))
r(t)
}
.
The amortization function may also be represented as:
A(t, r(t), T ) = exp
{
C(t, T )−D(t, T )r(t)
}
, (3.34)
= exp
{(
γ +
σλ
α
− σ
2
2α2
)[
1
α
(
1− exp
(
− α(T − t)
))
− (T − t)
]
− σ
2
4α3
(
1− exp
(
− α(T − t)
))2
− 1
α
(
1− exp
(
− α(T − t)
))
r(t)
}
.
Here C(t, T ) andD(t, T ) provide information about the principal and outstanding amounts,
credit rating of the debtor, the amortization rate and the eﬀect of default and debtor
bankruptcy.
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3.3.1 Types of Loans
There exists three types of loans namely a ﬁxed rate loan, series loan and an annuity loan
(Norberg [78]). The interest rate on the contract is ﬁxed and the duration of the contract
is only valid on the interval 0 ≤ t ≤ n. A ﬁxed rate loan is entirely repaid at the end of
the contract, that is, F (t, r(t)) = n(t) where
n(t, r(t)) =
⎧⎨⎩ 0, if 0 ≤ t < n1, if t ≥ n.
The amortization function is obtained directly from (3.10):
A(t, r(t)) = n(t, r(t)) + rt. (3.35)
A series loan has repayments of an annuity form. Therefore it is as a recurring periodic
series of payments over a speciﬁed period of time. The continuous version of the series
loan is given by F (t, r(t)) =
t
n
. The amortization function is obtained from (3.10):
A(t, r(t)) = F (t, r(t)) +
∫ t
0
(1− F (τ))r(τ)dτ
=
t
n
+ rt
(
1− t
2n
)
. (3.36)
We also obtain the diﬀerential equation (3.9):
dA(t, r(t))
dt
=
dF (t, r(t))
dt
+
dI(t, r(t))
dt
=
1
n
+ r
(
1− t
n
)
, (3.37)
where
dF (t, r(t))
dt
is ﬁxed and
dI(t, r(t))
dt
is linear decreasing.
An annuity loan is called so because the instalments are the same amount throughout
the repayment period, assuming the interest rate remains the same. To start with the
interest portion of the instalment is high and the repayment portion of the instalment is
low. As the loan is repaid, the interest portion decreases and the loan repayment portion
increases. The continuous version of this type of loan is given by A(t, r(t)) =
t
a¯n
where
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a¯n is given by:
a¯n =
∫ n
0
exp
(
− rτ
)
dτ
=
1− exp
(
− rn
)
r
. (3.38)
We obtain the repayment function F (t, r(t)) from equation (3.13):
F (t) = 1− a¯n−t
a¯n
= 1−
1− exp
(
− r(n− t)
)
1− exp
(
− rn
) . (3.39)
We apply the diﬀerential equation (3.9) to obtain:
dA(t, r(t))
dt
=
dF (t, r(t))
dt
+
dI(t, r(t))
dt
=
exp
(
− r(n− t)
)
a¯
+
1− exp
(
− r(n− t)
)
a¯
. (3.40)
In the case where n = ∞ both the ﬁxed and series loan contracts specializes to an inﬁnite
loan without complete repayment.
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3.4 Dynamic modelling of the loan-issuing rate
One of the biggest assumptions to make about interest rates is to consider it to be constant.
In reality, this is becoming less fashionable since ﬁnancial markets have become more
sophisticated and complex. There are many securities with a longer duration that are
inﬂuenced by trading in these markets. Therefore short-term stochastic interest rate
models (such as Vasicek, Cox-Ingersoll, Ho-Lee) have been developed (see for instance
Cairns [31] and Baz, Chacko [20] for a description on interest rate models).
The rate of return r(t) may behave in an unpredictable manner and therefore it can be
modelled as a one-factor diﬀusion process (see, for instance, Cairns, Blake, Dowd [32]) by
the following stochastic diﬀerential equation:
dr(t) = μr(r(t))dt +
N∑
k=1
σrk(r(t))dXk(t),
= μr(r(t))dt + σ
′
r(r(t))dX(t). (3.41)
where X(t) = (X1(t), . . . , XN(t))
′
are independent standard brownian motions. We fur-
ther deﬁne σr(r) = (σr1(r), . . . , σrN (r))
′
, where σr is the r-th row of the n× n volatility
matrix
(
σrk
)N
r,k=1
(see Fouche, Mukkudem-Petersen, Petersen [46]).
Fouche, Mukkudem-Petersen, Petersen [46] model the loans applied exogeneously which
can be expressed by a stochastic integral formula:
l(t) = l(0) +
∫ T
0
rl(s)ds+
∫ T
0
σl(s)dXl(s). (3.42)
The lending model can be expressed in diﬀerential form by the dynamics:
dl(t) = rl(t)dt + σl(t)dXl(t), (3.43)
where l : Ω× T → R is a stochastic process denoting the loan issuing rate whose value at
time t is represented by l(t), σl(t) denotes the volatility (unpredictable movement of the
process) and Xl : Ω × T → R is a standard Brownian motion satisfying the properties
of (1.2.6). Under these characteristics, the loan issuing rate is described by the following
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dynamics,
dl(t) = l(t)
[
φl
(
μ− ln l(t)
)
dt + σldXl(t)
]
, (3.44)
where φl represents the rate of mean reversion to the long run mean denoted by μ. This
model is proposed in this study and is distinct from those in the aforementioned bank
lending literature. This mean-reversion model has been employed by Fouche, Mukkudem-
Petersen, Petersen [46] whereby they model the loan issuing rate as a stochastic process.
Applying Itoˆ’s formula (1.3) to the log-normal diﬀusion process, St = ln l(t), yields:
d(St) =
1
St
[
φl
(
μ− St
)
Stdt + σlStdXl(t)
]
+ 0
+
1
2
(−1
S2t
)
σ2l S
2
t dt
= φl
(
μ− St
)
dt + σldXl(t)− 1
2
σ2l dt.
Grouping similar terms together, yields:
d(St) =
[
φl
(
μ− St
)
− 1
2
σ2l
]
dt + σldXl(t)
= φl
(
αˆ− St
)
dt + σldXl(t), (3.45)
where αˆ = μ − σ
2
2φl
. The loan issuing rate can now be characterized as an Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process. The Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process is expressed in the following manner:
dl(t) =
[
φl
(
μ− l(t)
)
dt + σldXl(t)
]
. (3.46)
According to [87] the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process is used to model commodities such as
agricultural products, metals, petroleum, foreign currencies, ﬁnancial instruments, indexes
and physical items such as oil and gold. The Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, l : Ω× T → R
can be modelled as a path-continuous scalar Itoˆ process deﬁned on the probability space
(Ω,F ,P) and it can be represented by the stochastic integral formula:
l(t) = l(0) exp(−φlt) + μ(1− exp(−φlt))
+ σl exp(−φlt)
∫ t
0
exp(φls)dXl(s). (3.47)
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The stochastic variable St has a normal distribution with an expected value, denoted by
E[l(t)], and a variance denoted by V ar[l(t)], respectively under an equivalent martingale
measure as follows:
E[l(t)] = μ + (X(0)− μ) exp(−φlt)
= X(0) exp(−φlt) + μ(1− exp(−φlt)).
where E
∫ t
0
exp(−φl(t− s)) dXl(s) = 0 and for the variance:
V ar[l(t)] = E{l(t)− E[l(t)]}2
= σ2E
{∫ t
0
exp(−φl(t− s)) dXl(s)
}2
= σ2
∫ t
0
E{exp(−φl(t− s)) dXl(s)}2
= σ2
∫ t
0
exp(−2φl(t− s)) ds
=
σ2(1− exp(−2φlt))
2φl
.
The parameters for the mean reversion, αˆ and φl, can be estimated by regressional changes
using a time series technique called diﬀerencing. The Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process is the
continuous-time version of the ﬁrst-order autoregressive time series process AR(1). Ap-
plying the diﬀerence method on equation (3.47) (see [87]) yields:
dl(t) = l(t)− l(t− 1)
= μ(1− exp(−φlΔt)) + (exp(−φlΔt)− 1)l(t− 1) + ε(t), (3.48)
where ε(t) are independent, identically distributed normal random variables with mean
zero and standard deviation, σε, that is εt ∼ N(0, σε). In order to estimate the regression
for the loan issuing rate, we run the regression:
l(t)− l(t− 1) = b + cl(t− 1) + ε(t),
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where b = μ(1 − exp(−φlΔt)) and c = (exp(−φlΔt) − 1). Estimating the parameters αˆ
and φ yields:
μ =
b
c
;
φl = − ln(1 + b);
σ = σε
√
2 ln(1 + b)
(1 + b)2 − 1 . (3.49)
In the paper of Mukkudem-Petersen, Petersen [73], the loan-issuing rate is represented
by means of a geometric brownian motion. The advantages of this type of model is that
it makes the problem more analytically tractable and it provides a closed form solution
which could be simulated. The geometric browian motion is one of the most widely used
continuous stochastic processes in economic theory with applications to option pricing,
equities, commoditites and stock prices. The increments of the loan-issuing rate will follow
a lognormal distribution. The behaviour of the loan-issuing rate can be represented by a
path-continuous scalar Ito process deﬁned on the probability space (Ω,F ,P) as
δ(t) = δ0 +
∫ t
0
μδ(δ(s), s)ds+
∫ t
0
σδ(δ(s), s)dXδ(s), t ≥ 0. (3.50)
The integral equation (3.50) are represented by the following stochastic diﬀerential equa-
tion:
dl(t) = δ(t)
[
μδdt + σδdXδ(t)
]
, (3.51)
where the drift parameter is denoted by μδ ∈ R and the volatility parameter is denoted
by σδ ∈ R+ in the loan-issuing rate, respectively . The diﬀerential dXδ(t) represents the
economic shocks that the loan-issuing rate is exposed to. Applying Itoˆ’s formula (1.3) to
the log-normal diﬀusion process, F (δ(t), t) = log δ(t), yields:
dF (δ(t), t) =
(
1
log δ(t)
μδ log δ(t) + F (t) +
1
2
( −1
log2δ(t)
)
σ2δ log
2δ(t)
)
dt
+
1
log δ(t)
σδ log δ(t) dXδ(t)
=
{
μδ − 1
2
σ2δ
}
dt + σδdXδ(t).
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Integrating over the interval from (0, T ] yields the following:
log δ(t) = log δ(0) +
∫ t
0
dF (δ(s), s)
= log δ(0) +
∫ t
0
{
μ− 1
2
σ2δ
}
ds+
∫ t
0
σδdXδ(s)
= log δ(0) +
{
μ− 1
2
σ2δ
}
t + σδXδ(t)
δ(t) = δ0 exp((μ− 1
2
σ2)t + σδXδ(t)), (3.52)
where we assume δ(0) = δ0.
Therefore the change in the loan-issuing rate will grow at an expontential rate. Modelling
the loans by a geometric brownian process may have its advantages but it also has its
drawbacks such as that the loan issuing rate may explode towards inﬁnity which is not
realistic. We illustrate by producing two graphs of the disadvantages of modelling the
loan-issuing rate as a geometric brownian motion over period of 10 years and 20 years
respectively.
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Figure 3.1: Modelling the loan-issuing
rate as a geometric brownian motion
over a period of 10 years, that is, 0 ≤
t ≤ 10;
Parameters are σ = 0.04 and μ = 0.04.
The initial interest rate is δ0 = 11%.
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Figure 3.2: Modelling the loan-issuing
rate as a geometric brownian motion
over a period of 20 years, that is, 0 ≤
t ≤ 20;
Parameters are σ = 0.04 and μ = 0.04.
The initial interest rate is δ0 = 11%.
Instead the dynamics of the loan-issuing rate may be represented by means of an Ornstein-
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Ulhenbeck process. In this study we choose to model the loan-issuing rate via the square
root process. The mean reverting square root process (also known as the Cox-Ingersoll-
Ross model) (see Cox, Ingersoll, Ross [35]) is a stochastic diﬀerential equation that has
been widely applied to forecast interest rates and other ﬁnancial quantities (see for in-
stance Adkins, Krehbiel [1], Bhanot [23]). It is an alternative model to that of the Vasicek
model because of its desirable property of positivity and its richness of behaviour. The
aforementioned model does not allow the variability of the interest rates to grow too large
as interest rates rises. The mean reverting square root process has the form
dl(t) = φl
(
μ− l(t)
)
dt + σl
√
l(t)dXl(t), (3.53)
where φ, μ and σl are positive constants and dXl is a scalar brownian motion.
We illustrate the model by producing two graphs where the bank for instance charges
11% on their loans contracts to business and other ﬁnancial institutions over period of 20
years and 30 years respectively.
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Figure 3.3: Modelling the loan-issuing
rate as a square root process over a pe-
riod of 20 years, that is, 0 ≤ t ≤ 20;
Parameters are σ = 0.04 and μ = 0.04.
The initial interest rate is δ0 = 11%.
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Figure 3.4: Modelling the loan-issuing
rate as a square root process over a pe-
riod of 30 years, that is, 0 ≤ t ≤ 30;
Parameters are σ = 0.04 and μ = 0.07.
The initial interest is δ0 = 11%.
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Chapter 4
Capital Adequacy Ratios
The Basel committee on banking supervision (BCBS)drafted a document, the 1988 Basel Accord,
that was aimed at how banks should manage and regulate their capital requirements. This
accord was an attempt to develop regulatory requirements of the banking industry with
four objectives in mind:
• to protect depositors and deposit insurance from the ravages of reckless portfolio
management by banks;
• to prevent system instabilities arising from bank failures;
• to strengthen the soundness and stability of the international banking system;
• to be applied with a high degree of consistency with a view to remove any source of
undesirable competitive behaviour among internationally active banks.
The 1988 Basel Accord consolidated capital requirements as the cornerstone of bank regu-
lation. The 1988 Basel Accord required banks to hold a minimum capital-to-risk-weighted
assets ratio of at least 8% (see for instance Berger, Herring, Szego [21] and Dewatripont,
Tirole [39]). According to von Thadden [92] this ratio is used to protect depositors and
deposit insurance schemes from the ravages of inadequate or reckless portfolio manage-
ment and promote the stability and eﬃciency of the banking structure. However, the 1988
Basel Accord, received widespread criticism for being too crude and oversimpliﬁed with
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the ever-changing standards set for the management and assessment of banking perfor-
mances. The 1988 Basel Accord, also known as the Basel I Accord, was further criticized
for treating all credit risk-types alike which potentially could lead to regulatory arbitrage
and it also seems to neglect contemporary credit risk mangement techniques. Moreover
the 1988 Basel Accord also failed to take into account the dynamic distortions of capital
regulation and complementary regulatory instruments such as supervisory monitoring or
prompt corrective regulatory action (see for instance Altmann [3] and Jackson, Perraudin
[57]). Reacting to these criticisms, the BCBS made several adjustments to the 1988 Basel
Accord document which led to the existence of the ﬁrst consultative paper (see [11]). Von
Thadden [92] further states that experiments carried out from the ﬁrst consultative paper
in the banking sector has resulted in a second and third consultative papers in January
2001 (see [12]) and April 2003 (see [17]) respectively. These three consultative papers
were conducted in an attempt to ﬁnalize the new accord. This new capital adequacy
framework will be formally known as the Basel II Capital Accord (see [12] and [18]) and
was to be implemented by all the major international banks globally from the end of year
2007. A cornerstone of the minimum capital requirement related to this accord is the
capital adequacy ratio (CAR) given by
CAR =
Indicator of Absolute Amount of Bank Capital
Indicator of Absolute Level of Bank Risk
. (4.1)
The capital adequacy ratio is a measure of the amount of a bank’s capital relative to
the amount of its credit exposures. This ratio is normally expressed as a percentage for
example a capital adequacy ratio of 8% means that a bank’s capital is 8% of the size of
its credit exposures. An international standard has been cultivated that requires banks
to hold minimum capital requirements. In the case where the CAR drops below a certain
minimum level due to the exposure to the risks (such as credit or market risk), the bank
might go bankrupt or the regulatory body may take certain actions on the bank. This may
result in the ultimate closure of the bank, thus aﬀecting the socio-economic development
or ﬁnancial status of a country. The aim of having minimum capital adequacy ratios is to
guarantee that banks are prepared to absorb a reasonable level of losses before becoming
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insolvent. Applying minimum capital adequacy ratios helps to promote the stability and
eﬀectiveness of the banking system by reducing the likelihood of banks becoming insol-
vent. When a ﬁnancial institution, in this case a bank, becomes insolvent then this may
lead to a loss of conﬁdence in the ﬁnancial system, causing ﬁnancial problems for other
banks and it might even threaten to distort the smooth functioning of ﬁnancial markets.
Determining capital adequacy ratios requires some adjustments to be made to the amount
of capital shown on the balance sheet.
On the other hand, CARs depend on the ratio of bank capital to the risk-weighted assets.
The numerator of (4.1) relies on the market values of all on- and -oﬀ-balance sheet assets
and liabilities. The denominator of (4.1) should measure the bank’s risk exposure or the
ﬂuctuation of its wealth or charter value. In principle, it should be possible for the afore-
mentioned components of the CAR to be used to resolve the trade-oﬀ between ﬂexibility
and regulatory standardization in the banking industry. In this study, we concentrate our
eﬀorts on the Basel II risk-based capital adequacy ratio (Basel II CAR) given by
Basel II CAR (z) =
BRC (C)
TRWAs (a)
(4.2)
The main objectives of the Basel II CAR are to:
• make capital allocation of banks more risk sensitive;
• separate operation rational risk from credit risk and calculate separate charges for
each;
• ensure that regulatory capital requirements are more in line with economic capital
requirements of banks;
• encourage banks to use their own internal systems for arriving at levels of regulatory
capital.
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We provide a diagrammatic overview of the Basel II capital accord.
Pillar 1:
Minimum
Capital
Requirement
Definition
of Capital
Risk-Weighted
Assets
Credit
Risk
Credit
Risk
Mitigation
Securit-
ization
Market
Risk
Operational
Risk
Minimum
Ratio
Pillar II:
Supervisory
Review
Process
Banks’
Processes
Supervisory
Review
Minimum
Capital
Levels
Intervention
& Remedial
Action
Pillar III:
Market
Discipline
Disclosure
Requirements
Qualitative
Requirements
Quantitative
Requirements
Figure 4.1: Diagrammatic Overview of the Basel II Capital Accord
There exist diﬀerent types of common capital adequacy ratios, such as the Tier 1 risk-
based capital ratio, total risk-based capital ratio (Tier 1 + Tier 2 + Tier 3), leverage ratio
and common stockholders’ equity ratio.
The Tier 1 capital ratio is deﬁned as
Tier 1 Capital ratio =
Tier 1 Capital
Risk-adjusted Assets
. (4.3)
Internationally active banks are expected to meet a minimum tier 1 risk-based capital
ratio of at least 4%.
The total risk-based capital adequacy ratio under the Basel II Accord is deﬁned as
Total risk-based Capital ratio =
Bank Regulatory Capital
Risk-adjusted Assets
. (4.4)
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Commercial banks are expected to meet a minimum total risk-based capital ratio of at
least 8 %.
The leverage ratio is expressed as
Leverage ratio =
Tier 1 capital
Average total consolidated assets
. (4.5)
The average total consolidated assets is deﬁned as the quarterly average assets from a
bank’s most recent Call Report less goodwill and other intangible assets.
The Common stockholders’ equity ratio is deﬁned as
Common stockholders’ Equity ratio =
Common stockholders equity
Balance sheet assets
. (4.6)
Fouche, Mukuddem-Petersen, Petersen (see [46]) provides continuous-time stochastic mod-
els for each of the aforementioned capital adequacy ratios. In each case they derive explicit
formulae separately and ultimately express them in the ratio forms (4.3), (4.4), (4.5) and
(4.6) respectively.
4.1 Dynamics of Capital Adequacy Ratio
In this study we concentrate our eﬀorts on deriving an explicit formula for the total risk-
based capital adequacy ratio. In computing the total risk-based capital adequacy ratio
(CAR) we introduce a new state variable
CAR (z(t)) =
Bank Regulatory Capital (C(t))
Total Risk-Weighted Assets (a(t))
. (4.7)
Theorem 4.1.1 (Explicit SDE for the Capital Adequacy Ratio of a Bank):
Suppose that the dynamics of bank regulatory capital C(t) and total risk-weighted assets
a(t) are described by (2.6) and (2.7), respectively, and pa(t) = pa(t)dt. Then the dynamics
of total risk-based capital adequacy ratio z of a bank may be represented by
dz(t) = z(t)
{(
− μ(t) + π′(t)Ψ
[
ζ − σ
]
+ σ20 + σ
′
σ
)
dt
−σ0dX0(t) +
(
π
′
(t)Ψ− σ′
)
dX(t)
}
− pa(t)dt. (4.8)
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Proof.
In this proof we derive (4.8) by mainly using the general Itoˆ formula. Let U(t) =
1
a(t)
then
dU(t) =
−1
a2(t)
da(t) +
1
2
2
a3(t)
a2(t)σ
′
σdt
=
σ
′
σ
a(t)
dt− 1
a2(t)
[
a(t)
[(
r(t) + μ(t)
)
dt + σ0dX0(t) + σ
′
dX(t)
]]
=
σ
′
σ
a(t)
dt− 1
a(t)
[(
r(t) + μ(t)
)
dt + σ0dX0(t) + σ
′
dX(t)
]
=
1
a(t)
(
σ
′
σ − r(t)− μ(t) + σ20
)
dt− 1
a(t)
σ0dX(t)− 1
a(t)
σ
′
dX(t).
Now we apply the Itoˆ stochastic product rule:
dz(t) = d(C(t)U(t))
= C(t)dU(t) + U(t)dC(t) +
(
C(t)π
′
(t)σΨ
1
a(t)
)
dt.
Since we deﬁned the state variable (4.7) we have
dz(t) = z(t)
{(
σ
′
σ − r(t)− μ(t) + σ20
)
dt− σ0dX0(t)− σ′dX(t)
}
+ z(t)
{
r(t) + π
′
(t)Ψζ
}
dt + z(t)π
′
(t)ΨdX(t)− pa(t)dt + zΨπ′(t)σdt
= z(t)
{
σ
′
σ − μ(t) + σ20 + π
′
(t)Ψ
[
ζ − σ
]}
dt− pa(t)dt
− z(t)σ0dX0(t) + z
(
Ψπ
′
(t)− σ′
)
dX(t)
= z(t)
{(
− μ(t) + π′(t)Ψ
[
ζ − σ
]
+ σ20 + σ
′
σ
)
dt
−σ0dX0(t) +
(
π
′
(t)Ψ− σ′
)
dX(t)
}
− pa(t)dt.
We note that p = 0 corresponds to the situation where we have a once-oﬀ TRWAs outﬂow
from bank regulatory capital at time t0. On the other hand, p = 0 implies that there is a
continuous outﬂow of TRWAs from bank regulatory capital at a rate of pa(t) throughout
the interval T = [t0, t1].
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Figure 4.2: Trajectory of the capital ad-
equacy ratio over a period of 20 years,
that is, 0 ≤ t ≤ 20.
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Figure 4.3: Trajectory of capital ade-
quacy ratio over a period of 30 years,
that is, 0 ≤ t ≤ 30.
4.2 Threshold Processes and Benchmarks
In situations where z(t) exceeds a certain CAR reference process, zr(t), or a banking
benchmark, b, regulators may pressurize banks to increase CARs. This process may
involve the withdrawal of insurance coverage, cease-and-desist orders, limits on asset
growth and brokered deposits, prohibition of dividend payments and even bank closure.
However, these measures are sometimes not very eﬀective and may only be applicable to a
small minority of banks. In an attempt to address this problem, in the USA, the prompt
corrective action feature of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act
(FDICIA) was implemented to improve capital-based incentives by making some of the
aforementioned regulatory actions mandatory when CARs fall into certain capitalization
categories. The CAR reference process, zr(t), may be a deterministic function of time
and largely depends on the rate of inﬂow and variability of bank capital. How to choose
the constant benchmark, b, in terms of the optimal operation and regulation of the bank
(see for instance Berger, Herring, Szego [21]; Bhattacharya, Thakor [25]; Freixas, Rochet
[50] and Santos [85]) oﬀers another interesting challenge. The CAR, z(t), at which moral
hazard incentives become important relies more on the diﬀerence between z(t) and its
benchmark, b, than on the actual level of z(t). Thus, for problematic banks, one of the
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objectives should at least be to keep z(t) as close as possible to zr(t) and ultimately to b.
The next result provides an explicit formula for the CAR threshold, zp(t), and considers its
relationship with an associated TRWA threshold, ap(t), and a CAR regulatory benchmark,
b. Although many approaches can be adopted to characterize the aforementioned concepts,
we consider zp(t) to be a deterministic function of time with a dependence on the rate of
change and variability of TRWAs between t and T.
Theorem 4.2.1 (CAR and TRWA Threshold Processes): Suppose that the dynam-
ics of bank regulatory capital, C(t), total risk-weighted assets a(t) and capital adequacy
ratio z(t) are described by (2.6), (2.7), and (4.8), respectively. Then there exists an explicit
formula for the CAR threshold process, zp(t), of the form
zp(t) :=
Cp(t)
ap(t)
= b + pv(τ), v(τ) =
∫ T
t
exp
{
M(t, τ)− σ′θ(τ − t)
}
dτ, (4.9)
where Cp and ap are the threshold values of the bank regulatory capital (BRC) and total
risk-weighted assets (TRWAs), respectively, and b is a CAR regulatory benchmark. Here
ap and b may be expressed as
ap(t) =
Cp(t)
b + pv(τ)
and b =
Cp(t)− ap(t)pv(τ)
ap(t)
, (4.10)
respectively.
Proof. Since we work in a complete market, we have that the TRWAs are completely
hedgeable. Also we suppose that Q is a risk-neutral pricing measure under which the n
risky equities have the dynamics
dxi(t) = xi(t)
[
r(t)dt +
n∑
j=1
σijdX̂j(t)
]
, i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
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where the X̂j ’s are independent standard Q-Brownian motions. In this case, with the
help of (2.9), we can price future Tier 1 capital inﬂows uniquely as
EQ
[ ∫ T
t
exp
{
−
∫ τ
t
r(s)d(s)
}
pa(τ)dτ
∣∣∣∣Ft]
= pEQ
[ ∫ T
t
a(t) exp
{∫ τ
t
μ(s)ds− σ′θ(τ − t)− 1
2
|σ|2(τ − t)
+σ
′
(
X̂(τ)− X̂(t)
)}
dτ
∣∣∣∣Ft]
= a(t)p
∫ T
t
exp
{
M(t, τ)− σ′θ(τ − t)
}
dτ = a(t)
{
zp(t)− b
}
,
where
M(t, τ) =
∫ τ
t
μ(s)ds− 1
2
|σ|2(τ − t) + σ′
(
X̂(τ)− X̂(t)
)
.
We present the categories of banking benchmark regulatory ratios (see Mukkudem-Petersen,
Petersen [76]).
Categories b T1CAR TCAR TE
Well-Capitalized ≥ 0.1 and ≥ 0.06 and ≥ 0.06 –
Adequately ≥ 0.08 and ≥ 0.04 and ≥ 0.04 –
Capitalized –
Undercapitalized ≥ 0.06 and ≥ 0.03 and ≥ 0.03 –
Signiﬁcantly < 0.06 or ≥ 0.03 or ≥ 0.03 and > 0.02
Undercapitalized
Critically
Undercapitalized ≤ 0.02
Figure 4.4: Categories of banking benchmark regulatory ratios
In ﬁgure 4.4, we have that TCAR , T1CAR and TE are the abbreviations for total CAR
(also known as the leverage ratio), Tier 1 CAR and tangible equity, respectively. Also, the
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CAR column in the said ﬁgure gives an indication of possible values for the benchmark,
b. In reality, the vast majority of banks ﬁt into the ”well-capitalized” category.
In practice, capital adequacy regulation stipulates a uniform b below which banks are sub-
ject to regulatory intervention. These minimums remain relatively stable over a period of
years, although regulators have the discretion to set higher requirements for banks that
are perceived to pose higher risks. How the CAR benchmark, b, is chosen in relation to
the critical values presented in ﬁgure 4.4, is dependent on several factors. Among these
are the type and size of the bank in question. Virtually every bank failure theory postu-
lates that a higher CAR is associated with a lower future probability of failure. Despite
this, the relationship between the CAR and bank safety is often relatively weak. A higher
CAR does not always predict a lower probability of failure in the immediate future and
explains little of bank performance variation.
The precise choice of a CAR regulatory benchmark, b, in terms of the optimal risk proﬁle
and regulation of the bank (see for instance Berger, Herring, Szego [21]; Mukkudem-
Petersen, Petersen [76]), oﬀers an interesting challenge. The CAR, z(t), at which moral
hazard incentives become important relies more on the diﬀerence between z(t) and its
benchmark, b, than on the actual level of z(t). Thus, for problematic banks, one of the
objectives should at least be to keep z(t) as close as possible to zp(t) and ultimately to b.
Another important issue is related to the impact of zp(t) ≤ b or b < zp(t) over time. In the
former case, we conjecture that zp(t) will act as a threshold for corrective action or even
bank closure. As far as the other inequality is concerned, zp(t) may be a threshold which
indicates that supervisory intervention may be relaxed. We note that at t = T the CAR
threshold, zp(t), corresponds to the industry benchmark, b. A similiar discussion as the
one for z(t), zp(t) and b, can be undertaken for a(t), ap(t) and some TRWAs regulatory
benchmark, ba.
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4.3 An Optimal Asset Allocation Strategy in Bank
Management
We present and solve an optimization problem using the asset allocation strategy π as
the control variable. The optimal allocation strategy π will be split over three assets.
The objective is to maximize a terminal utility function of the capital adequacy ratio z.
Numerical simulations will be done on π∗0 , π
∗
1 and π
∗
2. Here π
∗
0 represents the proportion
invested in the cash funds, π∗1 represent the proportion invested in the bond fund and π
∗
2
represent the proportion invested in the equities fund.
4.3.1 Optimal Bank Asset Allocation
In this section, we make use of the outcomes of theorem 4.1.1 to solve an optimal bank as-
set allocation problem. Our analysis of CARs considers the stochastic diﬀerential equation
(4.8) from theorem 4.1.1 on a given time interval [0, T ].
An Optimal Asset Allocation Problem
In the sequel, we concentrate our eﬀorts on maximising a terminal utility function,
u(r(T ), z(T )), where u is expressed as
u(r(T ), z(T )) =
1
α
f(T, r(T ))g(T, z(T ))α, for α < 1, α = 0; (4.11)
We express the function g as follows
g(t, z(t)) = z(t) + (zp(t)− ρ), (4.12)
where for zp deﬁned by (4.9), we have zp(T ) = ρ so that
g(T, z(T )) = z(T ).
The choice of (4.12) for g is motivated by the fact that throughout [0, T ] the risk of
bank failure is described in terms of z(t), zp(t) and ρ. We assume that a commercial
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bank’s terminal utility depends on both its bank regulatory capital and its total risk-
weighted assets. In this study we focus on two special cases: (a) the capital adequacy
ratio, z(t) =
C(t)
a(t)
. The bank’s terminal utility has the form
u(r(T ), zπ(T )) ≡ u(zπ(T )).
For the asset allocation strategy, π, we choose the expected terminal utility as
J(t, r, z; π) = E
[
u(r(T ), zπ(T )) : r(t) = r, zπ(t) = z
]
, (4.13)
where zπ is the trajectory of z given π. We determine a control law that maximizes the
expected terminal utility J : G → R+ given by (4.13), where G is the class of admissible
control laws
G =
{
(π(·, z) : π bounded, adapted so that z ≥ 0 a.s.
}
. (4.14)
We are now in a position to state the stochastic optimal control problem for bank asset
allocation that we solve in the sequel assuming σ0 = 0, that is, only hedgeable market
risk. The condition p > 0 indicates positive ongoing contribution to the bank wealth and
zero non-hedgeable market risk. Now let
V (t, r, z) = sup
π∈G
J(t, r, z; π),
Theorem 4.3.1 (Optimal strategy): Suppose that G = ∅, where the admissible class
of control laws, G is given by (4.14). Also, consider the stochastic diﬀerential equation for
the z-dynamics from (4.8) and the expected terminal utility, J : G → R+, given by (4.13).
For the optimization problem above, the optimal solution,
π∗ = arg sup
π∈G
J(t, r, z; π) ∈ G
if it exists, is given by:
π∗ = C
′−1
{
σ −
[
θ − σ
]
Vz
zVzz
− σr(r) Vzr
zVzz
}
. (4.15)
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Proof.
In order to prove the theorem, we follow the stochastic optimization procedure via dy-
namic programming (see, for instance, Bjork [26]; Korn [62] and Øksendal [80]). We
provide a systematic procedure to obtain the optimal asset allocation strategy. The
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman Equation (HJBE) for this problem is
Vt + sup
π∈G
{
AπV
}
= 0,
with
Aπ = μr(r) ∂
∂r
+ μπz
∂
∂z
+
1
2
νrr
∂2
∂r2
+ νπrz
∂2
∂r∂z
+
1
2
νπzz
∂2
∂z2
,
where
μπz = z
{
− μ(t) + π′(t)C
[
θ − σ
]
+ σ20 + σ
Tσ
}
+ p;
νrr = σr(r)
Tσr(r); ν
π
rz =
(
π
′
(t)C − σ′
)
σr(r)z;
νπzz = σ
2
0z
2 +
(
π(t)
′
C − σ′
)(
C
′
π(t)− σ
)
z2.
This is a partial diﬀerential equation (PDE) with the value function, V, being the un-
known. The solution of the optimization problem is an optimal path
π∗ = π∗(t, r, z;V ). (4.16)
In order to maximize AπV we diﬀerentiate the expression AπV with respect to π and
equate to zero. Thus
zC(θ − σ)Vz + (Dπ − Cσ)z2Vzz + Cσr(r)zVzr = 0,
where D = CC
′
. Solving for π we ﬁnd that the optimal asset allocation strategy has the
form
π∗ = C
′−1
{
σ −
[
θ − σ
]
Vz
zVzz
− σr(r) Vzr
zVzz
}
. (4.17)
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We need to know the partial derivatives of value function V (t, z, r) when making sim-
ulations of π∗. We shall avoid giving the detail of the computations and instead refer
to the paper of Cairns, Blake, Dowd [32], where the value function for a similar utility
maximisation was found. Our function is similar to the function appearing in Cairns,
Blake, Dowd [32]. We note that the interest rate used in Cairns, Blake, Dowd [32] for
this analysis is the Vasicek model. Nevertheless the value function in this way is at least
an approximation for the value function that we require. Thus we take V (t, z, r) to be as
follows
V (t, z, r) =
1
α
exp
[
f1(α, T − t) + αq(α)(T − t)
]
×
exp
[
f2(α, T − t)r(t)
](
z(t) + (zp(t)− ρ)
)α
(4.18)
where f1(α, T − t), f2(α, T − t) and q(α) are deﬁned as
f1(α, T − t) = −αC(t, T ) + αD(t, T )μ̂r(1− exp{−κr(T − t)})
+
α2D(t, T )2σ2r (1− exp{−2κr(T − t)})
4κr(1− α) , (4.19)
f2(α, T − t) = αD(t, T ) exp{−κr(T − t)} (4.20)
and
q(α) = σT θ − 1
2(α− 1)(θ − σ)
T (θ − σ)
respectively. In particular, at t = T, we have that
f1(α, T − T ) = −αC(t, T ), f2(α, T − T ) = αD(t, T ).
We now provide 2 diﬀerent graphs of the portfolio consisting of three assets over a period
of 20 and 30 years respectively.
The optimal weight in risky assets is equivalent to investing in a portfolio consisting of
three eﬃcient mutual funds namely cash (π∗0), bonds (π
∗
1) and equities (π
∗
2). The three
mutual funds can be interpret as follows:
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Figure 4.5: Trajectories for the optimal
strategies π∗0 , π
∗
1 and π
∗
2 over a period of
20 years, that is, 0 ≤ t ≤ 20.
0 10 20 30
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Figure 4.6: Trajectories for the optimal
strategies π∗0, π
∗
1 and π
∗
2 over a period of
30 years, that is, 0 ≤ t ≤ 30.
• The cash fund (Top Line) is the minimum-risk portfolio measured relatively to the
total-risk weighted assets, a(t), and its purpose is to hedge against market risk.
Asset proportions are represent by the vector π∗0. This fund can contain 100 %
cash if bank regulatory and total-risk weighted assets is uncorrelated however if
bank regulatory capital and total risk-weighted assets is correlated then this fund
contains also other assets.
• The bond fund (Middle Line) is the minimum-risk portfolio measured relative to
a(t)/A(t, r(t)) its purpose is to hedge credit risk. Asset proportions are represent
by the vector π∗1 . The returns on the bond fund is highly correlated with the
amortization yields.
• The equities fund (Bottom Line) is a risky portfolio which is eﬃcient when measured
relatively to both a(t) and a(t)/A(t, r(t)). Asset proportions are given by the vector
(π∗2). and its purpose is to satisfy the risk appetite of the bank.
We observe in ﬁgure (4.5) and ﬁgure (4.6) that the proportions (π∗0, π
∗
1 and π
∗
2) invested
into each asset respectively tends to remain consistent over time.
79
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5
Modelling of a Equity Allocation
Problem in Bank Management
The results in this chapter constitute a new contribution except where references are
explicitly given. In this chapter we investigate for an optimal portfolio composition in a
case where a bank will, over a short period, issue no new loans. This could well happen in
the current world economic crisis. Following the news of this catastrophe during the latter
part of 2008, there has since been some important contributions in the academic literature
providing explanations for the causes of the subprime mortgage crisis. An example of
such a paper is the one of Fouche, Mukuddem-Petersen, Petersen, Senosi (see [47]). The
said points out that the so called procyclicality has become a buzzword in discussions
about banking regulation. In essence, the movement in a ﬁnancial variable is said to be
procyclical if it tends to amplify business cycle ﬂuctuations. As such, procyclicality is an
inherent property of any ﬁnancial system. A feature of procyclicality is that banks tend to
restrict their lending activity during economic downturns because of their concern about
loan quality and the probability of loan defaults. This exacerbates the recession since
credit constrained businesses and individuals cut back on their investment activity. In
our contribution we give direction as to how to ﬁnd strategies for a bank towards recovery
but we ﬁrst provide a brief discussion on mean-variance portfolio approach. Mean-variance
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portfolio selection is concerned with the allocation of wealth among a variety of securities
so as to achieve the optimal trade-oﬀ between the expected return of the investment and
its risk over a ﬁxed planning horizon. Here we mean the risk of a portfolio measured by
the variance of its return. In this spirit, Markowitz (see [67]) designed a model whereby he
showed how to formulate the problem of minimizing a portfolio’s variance subject to the
constraint that its expected return equals a prescribed level as a quadratic program. In
this framework such an optimal portfolio is said to be variance minimizing, and if it also
achieves the maximum expected return among all portfolios having the same variance of
return then it is said to be eﬃcient. From an optimization point of view, in the problem
of portfolio selection it is desired to attain the highest possible expected return with the
lowest possible variance.
The mean-variance methodology has been surfacing in the literature from the static case
to the dynamic setting in banking (see for instance Alexander, Baptista, Yan [2]; Barber,
Chang, Thurston [6] and Leippold, Trojani, Vanini [66]). In the pension fund context,
there is a growing amount of papers that solves certain problems under the mean-variance
framework (see for instance Josa-Fombellida, Rincon-Zapatero [59] and the references
contained in it).
5.1 Optimizing the equity allocation
At time t = 0 we decompose the total-risk weighted assets a(0) into two components.
The ﬁrst component comprises of loans made to private agents and the second component
assembles the rest of the assets which are invested into marketable securities
a(0) = L(0) + M(0).
The marketable securities at time t = 0 will continue to evolve as M(t), which we assume
to follow a geometric brownian motion. In time, L(0) will be reduced at a rate dF (t). Here
we consider that the amortization is decomposed into a loan repayment and an interest
payment on the principle A(t, r(t)) = F (t, r(t))+I(t, r(t)). Furthermore, the inﬂow of the
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amortizations dA(t, r(t)) will be split over three assets. The following proposition gives
an expression for
dF (t, r(t))
dt
, which will be required later on.
Proposition 5.1.1 For a given rate of amortization
dA(t, r(t))
dt
, the rate
dF (t, r(t))
dt
is
given by :
dF (t, (r(t))
dt
=
dA(t, r(t))
dt
− L(t)r(t). (5.1)
Proof.
Note that in the absence of amortizations, the interest accumulated over a period dt by a
loan of value L(t) will be:
dL(t) = L(t)r(t)dt. (5.2)
When dA(t, r(t)) exceeds this amount, the remainder is directed to reducing the principal
debt. Hence the claim of the proposition follows.
Now notice that on its own, cash is ﬁxed (it does not grow in time). The bond and
bank equity have randomness associated with it and we denote it by B(t) and e1(t) re-
spectively. The bond is assumed to evolve as in (5.3) and equity evolves as de1(t). We
use B(t, T ) (see Boulier, Huang, Taillard [27]), to denote the price of this bond at time
t ∈ [0, T ], the diﬀusion equation of B(t, T ) is
dB(t, T )
B(t, T )
= r(t)dt + σB(T − t)(dX(t) + λrdt), (5.3)
where the premium λr is assumed to be constant. Recall that we opted to divide
ΔA(t, r(t)) into 3 parts. Now this will be done according to the fractions: fc(t), fB(t)
and fe1(t). Hereby we mean that the amount fc(t)ΔA(t, r(t)) is invested into cash,
fB(t)ΔA(t, r(t)) is invested into a bond and fe1(t)ΔA(t, r(t)) is invested into one equity.
Then ΔA(t, r(t)) contributes to the risk-weighted assets the amount:
Δa¯ = fc(t)wc
dA(t, r(t))
dt
Δt + fB(t)wB
dA(t, r(t))
dt
ΔB(t, s) + fe1(t)ωe1
dA(t, r(t))
dt
Δe1(t).
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Considering table (7.1) in the Appendix, we note that the weight in cash and bonds have
a zero risk-weighting, that is wc = wB = 0. In this case the total risk-weighted assets may
then be expressed as
a¯(t) = M(t) + L(0)− F (t, r(t)) +
∫ t
0
fe1(τ)we1
dA(τ, r(τ))
dτ
de1(τ).
In diﬀerential form
da¯(t) = dM(t)− dF (t)
dt
dt + fe1(t)we1
dA(t, r(t))
dt
de1(t)
= M(t)
[
rmdt + σmdX(t)
]
−
(
dF (t)
dt
)
dt
+ fe1(t)ωe1
dA(t, r(t))
dt
[
e1(t)
(
r0(t) + σ11ζ1
)
dt + e1(t)σ11dX(t)
]
=
[
M(t)rm − dF (t)
dt
+ e1(t)fe1(t)ωe1
dA(t, r(t))
dt
(
r0(t) + σ11ζ˜1
)]
dt
+
[
M(t)σm + e1(t)fe1(t)ωe1
dA(t, r(t))
dt
σ11
]
dX(t). (5.4)
The next step is to obtain the reciprocal of capital adequacy ratio.
Proposition 5.1.2 (Explicit SDE for the Reciprocal of the capital adequacy
ratio): Suppose that the dynamics of bank regulatory capital C(t) and total risk-weighted
assets a¯(t) are described by (2.6) and (5.4), respectively. Then the dynamics of the recip-
rocal of capital adequacy ratio z−1(t) of a bank satisﬁes the following SDE:
dz−1(t) =
[
z−1(t)
β2(t)
C2(t)
− z−1(t)ρ(t) + pz−2(t)
+
1
C(t)
(
M(t)rm −
(
dF (t, r(t))
dt
)
+ e1(t)fe1(t)ωe1
dA(t, r(t))
dt
(
r0(t) + σ11ζ1
))
+
β(t)
C(t)
(
M(t)σm + e1(t)fe1(t)ωe1
dA(t, r(t))
dt
σ11
)]
dt
+
[
− z−1(t)β(t) + 1
C(t)
(
M(t)σm + e1(t)fe1(t)ωe1
dA(t, r(t))
dt
σ11
)]
dX(t), (5.5)
where ρ(t) = r0(t) + π
′
(t)Ψζ and β(t) = π
′
(t)Ψ are the drift and diﬀusion term of bank
regulatory capital respectively.
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Proof.
In this proof we derive (5.5) by mainly using the general Itoˆ formula. Let f(C) =
1
C(t)
.
Then
df(C) = f˙(t) + f
′
(t)dC(t) +
1
2
f
′′
(t)β2(t)dt
= 0dt− 1
C2(t)
dC(t) +
1
2
(
2
C3(t)
β2(t)
)
dt
=
β2(t)
C3(t)
dt− 1
C2(t)
[
C(t)
[
ρ(t)dt + β(t)dX(t)
]
− pa¯(t)dt
]
=
β2(t)
C3(t)
dt− 1
C(t)
[
ρ(t)dt + β(t)dX(t)
]
+
pa¯(t)
C2(t)
dt
=
(
β2(t)
C3(t)
− ρ(t)
C(t)
+
pa¯(t)
C2(t)
)
dt− β(t)
C(t)
dX(t).
Now we apply the Itoˆ stochastic product rule:
dz−1(t) = d(a¯(t)C−1(t)) = a¯(t)dC−1(t) + C−1(t)da¯(t) + da¯(t)dC−1(t)
= a¯(t)
[(
β2(t)
C3(t)
− ρ(t)
C(t)
+
pa¯(t)
C2(t)
)
dt− β(t)
C(t)
dX(t)
]
+
1
C(t)
[(
M(t)rm − dF (t, r(t))
dt
+ e1(t)fe1(t)ωe1
dA(t, r(t))
dt
(
r0(t) + σ11ζ1
))
dt
+
(
M(t)σm + e1(t)fe1(t)ωe1
dA(t, r(t))
dt
σ11
)
dX(t)
]
+
β(t)
C(t)
(
M(t)σm + e1(t)fe1(t)ωe1
dA(t, r(t))
dt
σ11
)
dt.
Continuing in this fashion we have
dz−1(t) =
[
z−1(t)
β2(t)
C2(t)
− z−1(t)ρ(t) + pz−2(t) + M(t)rm
C(t)
− 1
C(t)
(
dF (t, r(t))
dt
)
+
e1(t)fe1(t)ωe1
dA(t, r(t))
dt
(
r0(t) + σ11ζ1
)
C(t)
+
β(t)
C(t)
(
M(t)σm + e1(t)fe1(t)ωe1
dA(t, r(t))
dt
σ11
)]
dt
+
(
− z−1(t)β(t) + 1
C(t)
(
M(t)σm + e1(t)fe1(t)ωe1
dA(t, r(t))
dt
σ11
)
dX(t).
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Grouping the drift and diﬀusion terms for dz−1(t) yields
dz−1(t) =
[
z−1(t)
β2(t)
C2(t)
− z−1(t)ρ(t) + pz−2(t) + 1
C(t)
(
M(t)rm −
(
dF (t, r(t))
dt
)
+ e1(t)fe1(t)ωe1
dA(t, r(t))
dt
(
r0(t) + σ11ζ1
))
+
β(t)
C(t)
(
M(t)σm + e1(t)fe1(t)ωe1
dA(t, r(t))
dt
σ11
)]
dt
+
[
− z−1(t)β(t) + 1
C(t)
(
M(t)σm + e1(t)fe1(t)ωe1
dA(t, r(t))
dt
σ11
)]
dX(t).
The yield of this investment is
dYA(t) = fc(t)
dA(t, r(t))
dt
Δt + fB(t)
dA(t, r(t))
dt
dB(t) + fe1(t)
dA(t, r(t))
dt
de1(t)
= fc(t)
dA(t, r(t))
dt
+ fB(t)
dA(t, r(t))
dt
[
B(t)r(t)dt + B(t)σB(T − t)(dX(t) + λrdt)
]
+ fe1(t)
dA(t, r(t))
dt
[
e1(t)
(
r0(t) + σ11ζ1
)
dt + e1(t)σ11dX(t)
]
which further simpliﬁes to:
dYA(t) =
[
fc(t)
dA(t, r(t))
dt
+ B(t)fB(t)
dA(t, r(t))
dt
(
r(t) + σB(T − t)λr
)
+ fe1(t)
dA(t, r(t))
dt
e1(t)
(
r0(t) + σ11ζ1
)]
dt
+
[
B(t)fB(t)
dA(t, r(t))
dt
σB(T − t) + fe1(t)
dA(t, r(t))
dt
e1(t)σ11
]
dX(t). (5.6)
Let DYA(t) denote the drift coeﬃcient of expression (5.6) and let Dz−1(t) denote the dif-
fusion coeﬃcient of dz−1(t). Then
DYA(t) =
[
fc(t)
dA(t, r(t))
dt
+ B(t)fB(t)
dA(t, r(t))
dt
(
r(t) + σB(T − t)λr
)
+ fe1(t)
dA(t, r(t))
dt
e1(t)
(
r0(t) + σ11ζ1
)]
(5.7)
and
Dz−1(t) =
[
− z−1(t)β(t) + 1
C(t)
(
M(t)σm + e1(t)f(t)ωe1
dA(t, r(t))
dt
σ11
)]
. (5.8)
85
 
 
 
 
We now pursue the following problem, and thither we allow for a function α(t) yet to be
determined. Our aim is now to maximize DYA(t) while minimizing Dz−1(t). More precisely
we formulate the above situation as follows.
Problem 5.1.3 (Optimal Bank Equity Allocation Problem): Given the coeﬃ-
cients DYA(t) and Dz−1(t) as above, we want to maximize the quantity
Q = DYA(t) − α(t)D2z−1(t) (5.9)
for some α(t) > 0 with respect to the proportions fc(t), fB(t) and fe1(t).
In order to obtain a solution for Problem 5.1.3 we shall determine the analytical solu-
tion for the optimal f(t) and then run simulations on f(t), dz−1(t) and dYA(t). For the
analysis, we consider two diﬀerent types of amortization functions, having the linear form
A(t) = Kt where K is a constant and a quadratic form A(t, r(t)) = Kt +
rt2
2
. The
problem as it stands will not have a unique solution, unless we impose certain limitations.
Thus we shall assume that fc(t) = fB(t) and write g(t) = fc(t) = fB(t). We also write
f(t) = fe1(t). In this case g(t) =
1− f(t)
2
and
dg(t)
f(t)
= −1
2
.
Theorem 5.1.4 (Solution to Optimal Bank Equity Allocation Problem): Sup-
pose that the z−1(t)-dynamics is described by the stochastic diﬀerential equation (5.5) and
we consider only the drift coeﬃcient of dYA(t) given by DYA(t) and the diﬀusion coeﬃ-
cient of dz−1(t) given by Dz−1(t). In this case, a solution f(t) to the optimal bank equity
allocation problem stated in Problem 5.1.3 is of the form
f(t) =
C2(t)
2α(t)e21(t)ω
2
e1
dA(t, r(t))
dt
σ211
[
− 1
2
− 1
2
B(t)
(
r(t) + σB(T − t)λr
)
+ e1(t)
(
r0(t) + σ11ζ1
)
+
Γ(t)z−1(t)β(t)
C(t)
− Γ(t)M(t)σm
C2(t)
]
, (5.10)
where Γ(t) = 2α(t)e1(t)ωe1σ11.
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Proof.
In order to maximise Q with respect to f(t), a necessary condition is that
dQ
df(t)
= 0.
dQ
df(t)
= −1
2
dA(t, r(t))
dt
− 1
2
B(t)
dA(t, r(t))
dt
(
r(t) + σB(T − t)λr
)
+
dA(t, r(t))
dt
e1(t)
(
r0(t) + σ11ζ1
)
−
Γ(t)
dA(t, r(t))
dt
C(t)
Dz−1(t) = 0.
We obtain the common factor
dA(t, r(t))
dt
:
dA(t, r(t))
dt
[
− 1
2
− 1
2
B(t)
(
r(t) + σB(T − t)λr
)
+ e1(t)
(
r0(t) + σ11ζ1
)
− Γ(t)
C(t)
Dz−1(t)
]
= 0
and divide by
dA(t, r(t))
dt
:
−1
2
− 1
2
B(t)
(
r(t) + σB(T − t)λr
)
+ e1(t)
(
r0(t) + σ11ζ1
)
− 2α(t)e1(t)ωe1σ11
C(t)
Dz(−1)(t) = 0.
Simplifying it further:
−1
2
− 1
2
B(t)
(
r(t) + σB(T − t)λr
)
+ e1(t)
(
r0(t) + σ11ζ1
)
+
Γ(t)z−1(t)β(t)
C(t)
− Γ(t)M(t)σm
C2(t)
−
2α(t)e21(t)f(t)ω
2
e1
dA(t, r(t))
dt
σ211
C2(t)
= 0.
Rearranging the terms, we obtain:
−
2α(t)e21(t)f(t)ω
2
e1
dA(t, r(t))
dt
σ211
C2(t)
=
1
2
+
1
2
B(t)
(
r(t) + σB(T − t)λr
)
− e1(t)
(
r0(t) + σ11ζ1
)
− Γ(t)z
−1(t)β(t)
C(t)
+
Γ(t)M(t)σm
C2(t)
2α(t)e21(t)f(t)ω
2
e1
dA(t, r(t))
dt
σ211
C2(t)
= −1
2
− 1
2
B(t)
(
r(t) + σB(T − t)λr
)
+ e1(t)
(
r0(t) + σ11ζ1
)
+
Γ(t)z−1(t)β(t)
C(t)
− Γ(t)M(t)σm
C2(t)
.
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Solving for f(t) we obtain:
f(t) =
C2(t)
2α(t)e21(t)ω
2
e1
dA(t, r(t))
dt
σ211
[
− 1
2
− 1
2
B(t)
(
r(t) + σB(T − t)λr
)
+ e1(t)
(
r0(t) + σ11ζ1
)
+
Γ(t)z−1(t)β(t)
C(t)
− Γ(t)M(t)σm
C2(t)
]
.
Simplifying it further and substituting Γ(t) = 2α(t)e1(t)ωe1σ11 into expression (5.10), we
obtain a particular form for f(t):
f(t) = − C
2(t)
4α(t)e21(t)ω
2
e1
dA(t, r(t))
dt
σ211
−
C2(t)B(t)
(
r(t) + σB(T − t)λr
)
4α(t)e21(t)ω
2
e1
dA(t, r(t))
dt
σ211
+
C2(t)e1(t)
(
r0(t) + σ11ζ1
)
2α(t)e21(t)ω
2
e1
dA(t, r(t))
dt
σ211
+
C2(t)2α(t)e1(t)ωe1σ11z
−1(t)β(t)
2α(t)e21(t)ω
2
e1
dA(t, r(t))
dt
σ211C(t)
− C
2(t)2α(t)e1(t)ωe1σ11M(t)σm
2α(t)e21(t)ω
2
e1
dA(t, r(t))
dt
σ211C
2(t)
= − C
2(t)
4α(t)e21(t)ω
2
e1
dA(t, r(t))
dt
σ211
−
C2(t)B(t)
(
r(t) + σB(T − t)λr
)
4α(t)e21(t)ω
2
e1
dA(t, r(t))
dt
σ211
+
C2(t)
(
r0(t) + σ11ζ1
)
2α(t)e1(t)ω2e1
dA(t, r(t))
dt
σ211
+
C(t)z−1(t)β(t)
e1(t)ωe1
dA(t, r(t))
dt
σ11C(t)
− M(t)σm
e1(t)ωe1
dA(t, r(t))
dt
σ11
.
With an explicit formula for the optimal allocation proportions we are now in a position
to run simulations.
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5.2 Simulations
Based on the aforegoing theory, in this section we present simulations on some of the
more important variables. The speciﬁc ones considered here are bank capital, total risk-
weighted assets, capital adequacy ratio and optimal bank equity allocation. We consider
two diﬀerent forms of the amortization function namely of a linear form and of a quadratic
form.
5.2.1 Linear Amortization function
In this section we only provide the graphs based on the assumption that an amortization
function has a linear form for bank capital, total risk-weighted assets, capital adequacy
ratio and a loan repayment. We will jointly interpret the aforementioned items in the
following section, that is, the quadratic amortization function and linear amortization
function together. Figure 5.1, ﬁgure 5.2, ﬁgure 5.3 and ﬁgure 5.4 are obtained from an
amortization function having a linear form A(t) = Kt, where K is a constant repayment
of the loan from an entity.
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Figure 5.1: Trajectory of the total risk-
weighted assets over a period of 40
months, that is, 0 ≤ t ≤ 40.
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Figure 5.2: Trajectory of bank regula-
tory capital over a period of 40 months,
that is, 0 ≤ t ≤ 40.
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Figure 5.3: Trajectory of the capital ad-
equacy ratio over a period of 40 months,
that is, 0 ≤ t ≤ 40.
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Figure 5.4: Repayment of a loan over a
period of 40 months, that is, 0 ≤ t ≤ 40.
5.2.2 Quadratic Amortization function
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Figure 5.5: Simulation of the total risk-
weighted assets over a period of 40
months, that is, 0 ≤ t ≤ 40.
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Figure 5.6: Trajectory of bank regula-
tory capital over a period of 40 months,
that is, 0 ≤ t ≤ 40.
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Figure 5.7: Trajectory of the capital ad-
equacy ratio over a period of 40 months,
that is, 0 ≤ t ≤ 40.
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Figure 5.8: Repayment of a loan over a
period of 40 months, that is, 0 ≤ t ≤ 40.
Figure 5.5, ﬁgure 5.6, ﬁgure 5.7 and ﬁgure 5.8 are all obtained from an amortization
function having a form, A(t, r(t)) = Kt +
rt2
2
. Figure 5.1, ﬁgure 5.2, ﬁgure 5.5 and ﬁg-
ure 5.6 shows the trajectories for bank capital and the bank’s total risk-weighted assets
respectively. We observe that both items increase over the forty month period. The total
assets increases at a steady rate due to loans that are paid oﬀ by consumers or other
ﬁnancial institutions. Also loans represent the majority of a bank’s asset and a bank can
earn a higher interest on a loan contract than securities. Another factor contributing to
this increase is that banks do not like putting their assets into ﬁxed-income securities
because the the yield is not that great. However, investment-grade securities are liquid,
and they have higher yields than cash, so it is always prudent for a bank to keep securities
on hand in case they need to free up some liquidity. On the other hand bank capital can
eﬀect the lending behaviour of a bank. The regulatory capital requirements are explicitly
taken into account. Here the regulatory requirement depends on the loans granted which
establishes a relationship between bank capital and bank lending (we refer the reader
to Gambacorta, Mistrulli [51] and the references contained within for literature on the
relationship). Gambacorta, Mistrulli [51] explores how bank capital inﬂuences bank lend-
ing by considering the eﬀects of two economic disturbances namely monetary policy and
Gross Domestic Products (GDP) shocks. The impact of monetary policy eﬀects lending
91
 
 
 
 
in two ways, both based on adverse selection problems that aﬀect banks fund-raising:
the bank lending channel, which relies on imperfections in the market for bank debt and
the bank capital channel, which concentrates on an imperfect market for bank equity
(we refer the reader to Gambacorta, Mistrulli [51] for a more detailed discussion on the
bank capital channel and bank lending channel). The bank capital channel depends on
three assumptions. Firstly, there is an imperfect market for bank equity: banks cannot
easily issue new equity because of the presence of agency costs and tax disadvantages.
Secondly, banks are subject to interest rate risk due to the fact that their assets have a
longer maturity than their liabilities and thirdly, banks have to meet regulatory capital
requirements linked to credit supply.
Figure 5.3 and ﬁgure 5.7 shows trajectories for the capital adequacy ratios of a com-
mercial bank. In our case the trajectories represents a bank that is well-capitalized (a
bank whose capital-to-asset ratio is more than 10%). Well capitalized banks are in a
better position than less-capitalized banks to absorb economic disturbances such as the
monetary policies. Because they hold more capital in excess, well-capitalized banks need
to adjust their lending activities during economic downturns in order to avoid regulatory
capital shortfalls. Another reason could also be that their proﬁts are less sensitive to the
business cycle, as their portfolio choices may diﬀer from those taken by less-capitalized
banks. The way in which we constructed the continuous-time models ensures that the
capital adequacy ratio remains always above the minimum requirement of 8%.
Figure 5.4 and ﬁgure 5.8 show the trajectories for a loan that is paid-oﬀ by an amor-
tization rate having a linear form and a quadratic form respectively. Figure 5.4 shows
how a debt, in our case, is repaid over time by regular instalments. Figure 5.8 shows how
the debt is repaid where the amortization rate has the form
dA(t, r(t))
dt
= K + rt where
K is the principal and rt is the accrued interest.
In ﬁgure 5.8, there is substantial distinct allocation of the monthly payments toward the
interest, especially during the ﬁrst few months of the loan. Payment 1 allocates about
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80− 90% of the total payment towards interest and only 10− 20% toward the principal
balance. The percentage allocation towards payment of the principal solely depends on
the interest rate. Only after a certain payment into the loan does the payment allocation
towards principal and interest even out. After that, the majority of the monthly payment
is towards the principal balance pay down.
Secondly, the repetitive nature of an amortized loan, even in cases of decreasing interest
rates and principal balance decrease, can cause the borrower to pay a high percentage of
the original loan amount. This creates a situation that is economically unfavorable because
it is often mitigated by monthly decreasing payments and interest rate of reﬁnance.
Thirdly, the payment made on an amortized loan remains ﬁxed for the entire loan contract,
regardless of principal balance owed. Paying down a large amount of the principal balance
in no way aﬀects the monthly payment, it simply reduces the term of the loan contract
and reduces the amount of interest that can be charged by the lender resulting in a quicker
payoﬀ. To avoid these obstacles many borrowers may prefer to choose an interest-only
loan to satisfy their ﬁnancing needs.
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Figure 5.9: Trajectory of the fraction
f(t) over a period of 40 months, that
is, 0 ≤ t ≤ 40.
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Figure 5.10: Simulation of the fraction
f(t) over a period of 40 months, that is,
0 ≤ t ≤ 40.
Figure 5.9 and ﬁgure 5.10 represents the trajectories of the optimal allocation strategy to
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maximize the quantity
Q = DYA(t) − α(t)D2z−1(t).
Figure 5.9 is obtained from the a linear amortization function whereas ﬁgure 5.10 is
obtained from an amortization function having a quadratic form. We observe that in
both cases the fraction remains between 0 and 1. The aim of this investment strategy is
to balance risk and reward by apportioning a portfolio’s assets according to an institutions
goals, risk tolerance and investment horizon. The bank fund represents the proportions
of the fund invested in the portfolio in order to minimize the terminal solvency risk. The
mutual fund that provides investors with a portfolio of a ﬁxed or variable mix of the three
main asset classes - stocks, bonds and cash equivalents - in a variety of securities. In
the ﬁrst years where debt is large, the optimal strategy is to take more risk, borrowing
money to invest in the equity. The optimal strategy also has a prominent role whereby it
contributes to the value of the bank’s total risk-weighted assets.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this section, we interpret the main results encountered in this dissertation. In accor-
dance with the objectives of the Basel II capital accord, the models of banking items
constructed in this study are related to the methods currently being used to assess the
riskiness of bank portfolios and their minimum capital requirement (see [12] and [18]).
The assessment procedure mainly involves a consideration of the capital adequacy and
perceived supervisory risk. In particular, chapter 4 of this dissertation is devoted to the
description of the capital adequacy ratio and aswell in chapter 5. Here we constructed
continuous-time models for the capital adequacy ratio in a stochastic setting. We observe
in ﬁgure 4.2 and 4.3 that the trajectories of the capital adequacy ratio always remain
above the stipulated minimum requirement of 8% suggested by Basel II capital accord.
In ﬁgures 5.3 and 5.7 we observe that the trajectories of the capital adequacy ratio for a
well-capitalized bank (CAR ≥ 10%) always remain above the minimum requirement (see
ﬁgure 4.4 for the categories of the ratios).
Sections 4.2 and 4.3 are entirely devoted to the demonstration of how the capital ad-
equacy ratio can be optimized in terms of equity allocation. We observed that in ﬁgure
4.5 and ﬁgure 4.6 that the optimal allocation strategies (π∗0, π
∗
1 and π
∗
2) which is split over
the portfolio consisting of three assets (cash, bond and equity) remained consistent over
time.
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Chapter 5 is an original piece of work by the author of this dissertation where we demon-
strate how to employ a mean-variance optimization approach to equity allocation under
certain conditions. Determining the optimal investment strategy employed by the in-
vestor, in other words the decision on exactly how to distribute the total investment over
the diﬀerent possible assets in order to maximize their proﬁt from the ﬁnal contribution
in the planning horizon, is known as portfolio-optimization. In particular ﬁgures 5.9 and
5.10 illustrates the aformentioned concept.
The main thrust of future research may involve models of bank items driven by Le´vy
processes. These processes have an advantage over the more traditional modelling tools
such as Brownian motion in that they describe the non-continuous evolution of the value
of economic and ﬁnancial items more accurately. For instance, because the behavior of
bank loans, securities, capital and CARs are characterized by jumps, the representation
of the dynamics of these items by means of Le´vy processes is more realistic. As a re-
sult of this, recent research (see Gideon, Mukuddem-Petersen, Petersen [52]) has strived
to replace the existing Brownian motion-based bank models (see for instance Decamps,
Rochet, Roger [38], Leland [63], Fouche, Mukuddem-Petersen, Petersen [46]) by systems
driven by more general processes.
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Chapter 7
Appendix A
7.0.3 Table Containing Risk Categories, Risk-Weights and Rep-
resentative On-Balance Sheet Items
In this section, we provide a table of risk categories, risk-weights and representative on-
balance sheet items and verify the main results obtained in the previous sections.
Risk Risk Representative
Category Weight On-Balance Sheet Items
1 0% Cash, Reserves, Bonds
2 20% Marketable Securities, equities
3 50% Home Mortgages
4 100% Loans to Private Agents
Table 7.1: Risk Categories, Risk-Weights and Representative On-Balance Sheet Items.
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We ﬁrst provide a tabel of values for the following trajectories of each of the aforemen-
tioned items.
Symbol Value Parameter
n 40 period
h 0.1 increment
C(0) 1000 Bank capital at time 0
L(0) 3000 Loans in dollar ($) at time 0
ζ1 0.1 Market price of risk at time 0
λr 0.04 constant premium for bond
we1 0.2 weight in equity
σm 0.04 constant volatility for marketable securities
σ11 0.04 constant volatility for equity
α(t) 3 value for the notation
r 0.04 constant interest rate
rm 0.03 constant interest rate for marketable securities
dA(t, r(t))
dt
0.1 rate at which the loan is paid oﬀ (rate of amortization).
β(t) 0.03 diﬀusion term for bank capital
ρ(t) 0.2 drift term for bank capital
p 0.02 constant proportion of assets
M(0) 7000 marketable securities at time 0
e1(t) 1000 value of the ﬁrst bank equity at time 0
a(0) 10000 value of total assets at time 0
σB 0.04 volatility for the price of the bond
B(0) 100 value of the bond at time 0
Table 7.2: Parameter values for the constructed models and the amortization function
A(t) = Kt.
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Symbol Value Parameter
n 40 period
h 0.1 increment
C(0) 1000 Bank capital at time 0
L(0) 3000 Loan in dollar ($) at time 0
ζ1 0.02 Market price of risk at time 0
λr 0.10 constant premium for bond
we1 0.2 weight in equity
σm 0.03 constant volatility for marketable securities
σ11 0.04 constant volatility for equity
α(t) 1 value for the notation
r 0.04 constant interest rate
rm 0.03 constant interest rate for marketable securities
dA(t, r(t))
dt
0.1 rate at which the loan is paid oﬀ (rate of amortization).
β(t) 0.03 diﬀusion term for bank capital
ρ(t) 0.2 drift term for bank capital
p 0.02 constant proportion of assets
M(0) 7000 marketable securities at time 0
e1(t) 1000 value for the ﬁrst bank equity at time 0
a(0) 10000 value of total assets at time 0
σB 0.03 volatility for the price of the bond
B(0) 1000 value of the bond at time 0
rA 0.07 constant interest rate
Table 7.3: Parameter values for the constructed models and the amortization function
A(t, r(t)) = Kt +
rt2
2
.
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